diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 18 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 13 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h index 07c34087bd5e..547d7a0c9d05 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -45,8 +45,7 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs) * Prevent a mispredicted conditional call to set_fs from forwarding * the wrong address limit to access_ok under speculation. */ - dsb(nsh); - isb(); + spec_bar(); /* On user-mode return, check fs is correct */ set_thread_flag(TIF_FSCHECK); @@ -96,14 +95,7 @@ static inline unsigned long __range_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long si return ret; } -/* - * When dealing with data aborts, watchpoints, or instruction traps we may end - * up with a tagged userland pointer. Clear the tag to get a sane pointer to - * pass on to access_ok(), for instance. - */ -#define untagged_addr(addr) sign_extend64(addr, 55) - -#define access_ok(type, addr, size) __range_ok(addr, size) +#define access_ok(addr, size) __range_ok(addr, size) #define user_addr_max get_fs #define _ASM_EXTABLE(from, to) \ @@ -309,7 +301,7 @@ do { \ ({ \ __typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *__p = (ptr); \ might_fault(); \ - if (access_ok(VERIFY_READ, __p, sizeof(*__p))) { \ + if (access_ok(__p, sizeof(*__p))) { \ __p = uaccess_mask_ptr(__p); \ __get_user_err((x), __p, (err)); \ } else { \ @@ -378,7 +370,7 @@ do { \ ({ \ __typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *__p = (ptr); \ might_fault(); \ - if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, __p, sizeof(*__p))) { \ + if (access_ok(__p, sizeof(*__p))) { \ __p = uaccess_mask_ptr(__p); \ __put_user_err((x), __p, (err)); \ } else { \ @@ -426,7 +418,7 @@ extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_in_user(void __user *to, const voi extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n); static inline unsigned long __must_check __clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n) { - if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n)) + if (access_ok(to, n)) n = __arch_clear_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), n); return n; } |