From d31e0386a2f122b40b605eb0120a2fbcfca77868 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiri Olsa Date: Wed, 30 Mar 2022 13:05:10 +0200 Subject: bpf: Fix sparse warnings in kprobe_multi_resolve_syms Adding missing __user tags to fix sparse warnings: kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2370:34: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces) kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2370:34: expected void const [noderef] __user *from kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2370:34: got void const *usyms kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2376:51: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces) kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2376:51: expected char const [noderef] __user *src kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2376:51: got char const * kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2443:49: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2443:49: expected void const *usyms kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2443:49: got void [noderef] __user *[assigned] usyms Fixes: 0dcac2725406 ("bpf: Add multi kprobe link") Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov Reported-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220330110510.398558-1-jolsa@kernel.org --- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c index 7fa2ebc07f60..d8553f46caa2 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c @@ -2349,11 +2349,11 @@ kprobe_multi_link_handler(struct fprobe *fp, unsigned long entry_ip, } static int -kprobe_multi_resolve_syms(const void *usyms, u32 cnt, +kprobe_multi_resolve_syms(const void __user *usyms, u32 cnt, unsigned long *addrs) { unsigned long addr, size; - const char **syms; + const char __user **syms; int err = -ENOMEM; unsigned int i; char *func; -- cgit From a2fb49833cad07a53651c23dce508127085fae2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Masami Hiramatsu Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 10:11:17 +0900 Subject: rethook: Fix to use WRITE_ONCE() for rethook:: Handler Since the function pointered by rethook::handler never be removed when the rethook is alive, it doesn't need to use rcu_assign_pointer() to update it. Just use WRITE_ONCE(). Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/164868907688.21983.1606862921419988152.stgit@devnote2 --- kernel/trace/rethook.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/trace/rethook.c b/kernel/trace/rethook.c index ab463a4d2b23..b56833700d23 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/rethook.c +++ b/kernel/trace/rethook.c @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static void rethook_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) */ void rethook_free(struct rethook *rh) { - rcu_assign_pointer(rh->handler, NULL); + WRITE_ONCE(rh->handler, NULL); call_rcu(&rh->rcu, rethook_free_rcu); } -- cgit From 5b6547ed97f4f5dfc23f8e3970af6d11d7b7ed7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Wed, 16 Mar 2022 22:03:41 +0100 Subject: sched/core: Fix forceidle balancing Steve reported that ChromeOS encounters the forceidle balancer being ran from rt_mutex_setprio()'s balance_callback() invocation and explodes. Now, the forceidle balancer gets queued every time the idle task gets selected, set_next_task(), which is strictly too often. rt_mutex_setprio() also uses set_next_task() in the 'change' pattern: queued = task_on_rq_queued(p); /* p->on_rq == TASK_ON_RQ_QUEUED */ running = task_current(rq, p); /* rq->curr == p */ if (queued) dequeue_task(...); if (running) put_prev_task(...); /* change task properties */ if (queued) enqueue_task(...); if (running) set_next_task(...); However, rt_mutex_setprio() will explicitly not run this pattern on the idle task (since priority boosting the idle task is quite insane). Most other 'change' pattern users are pidhash based and would also not apply to idle. Also, the change pattern doesn't contain a __balance_callback() invocation and hence we could have an out-of-band balance-callback, which *should* trigger the WARN in rq_pin_lock() (which guards against this exact anti-pattern). So while none of that explains how this happens, it does indicate that having it in set_next_task() might not be the most robust option. Instead, explicitly queue the forceidle balancer from pick_next_task() when it does indeed result in forceidle selection. Having it here, ensures it can only be triggered under the __schedule() rq->lock instance, and hence must be ran from that context. This also happens to clean up the code a little, so win-win. Fixes: d2dfa17bc7de ("sched: Trivial forced-newidle balancer") Reported-by: Steven Rostedt Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Tested-by: T.J. Alumbaugh Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220330160535.GN8939@worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net --- kernel/sched/core.c | 14 ++++++++++---- kernel/sched/idle.c | 1 - kernel/sched/sched.h | 6 ------ 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c index d575b4914925..017ee7807930 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/core.c +++ b/kernel/sched/core.c @@ -5752,6 +5752,8 @@ static inline struct task_struct *pick_task(struct rq *rq) extern void task_vruntime_update(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *p, bool in_fi); +static void queue_core_balance(struct rq *rq); + static struct task_struct * pick_next_task(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *prev, struct rq_flags *rf) { @@ -5801,7 +5803,7 @@ pick_next_task(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *prev, struct rq_flags *rf) } rq->core_pick = NULL; - return next; + goto out; } put_prev_task_balance(rq, prev, rf); @@ -5851,7 +5853,7 @@ pick_next_task(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *prev, struct rq_flags *rf) */ WARN_ON_ONCE(fi_before); task_vruntime_update(rq, next, false); - goto done; + goto out_set_next; } } @@ -5970,8 +5972,12 @@ pick_next_task(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *prev, struct rq_flags *rf) resched_curr(rq_i); } -done: +out_set_next: set_next_task(rq, next); +out: + if (rq->core->core_forceidle_count && next == rq->idle) + queue_core_balance(rq); + return next; } @@ -6066,7 +6072,7 @@ static void sched_core_balance(struct rq *rq) static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct callback_head, core_balance_head); -void queue_core_balance(struct rq *rq) +static void queue_core_balance(struct rq *rq) { if (!sched_core_enabled(rq)) return; diff --git a/kernel/sched/idle.c b/kernel/sched/idle.c index 8f8b5020e76a..ecb0d7052877 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/idle.c +++ b/kernel/sched/idle.c @@ -434,7 +434,6 @@ static void set_next_task_idle(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *next, bool fir { update_idle_core(rq); schedstat_inc(rq->sched_goidle); - queue_core_balance(rq); } #ifdef CONFIG_SMP diff --git a/kernel/sched/sched.h b/kernel/sched/sched.h index 58263f90c559..8dccb34eb190 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/sched.h +++ b/kernel/sched/sched.h @@ -1232,8 +1232,6 @@ static inline bool sched_group_cookie_match(struct rq *rq, return false; } -extern void queue_core_balance(struct rq *rq); - static inline bool sched_core_enqueued(struct task_struct *p) { return !RB_EMPTY_NODE(&p->core_node); @@ -1267,10 +1265,6 @@ static inline raw_spinlock_t *__rq_lockp(struct rq *rq) return &rq->__lock; } -static inline void queue_core_balance(struct rq *rq) -{ -} - static inline bool sched_cpu_cookie_match(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *p) { return true; -- cgit From 386ef214c3c6ab111d05e1790e79475363abaa05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Date: Thu, 17 Mar 2022 15:51:32 +0100 Subject: sched: Teach the forced-newidle balancer about CPU affinity limitation. try_steal_cookie() looks at task_struct::cpus_mask to decide if the task could be moved to `this' CPU. It ignores that the task might be in a migration disabled section while not on the CPU. In this case the task must not be moved otherwise per-CPU assumption are broken. Use is_cpu_allowed(), as suggested by Peter Zijlstra, to decide if the a task can be moved. Fixes: d2dfa17bc7de6 ("sched: Trivial forced-newidle balancer") Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YjNK9El+3fzGmswf@linutronix.de --- kernel/sched/core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c index 017ee7807930..51efaabac3e4 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/core.c +++ b/kernel/sched/core.c @@ -6006,7 +6006,7 @@ static bool try_steal_cookie(int this, int that) if (p == src->core_pick || p == src->curr) goto next; - if (!cpumask_test_cpu(this, &p->cpus_mask)) + if (!is_cpu_allowed(p, this)) goto next; if (p->core_occupation > dst->idle->core_occupation) -- cgit From 0a70045ed8516dfcff4b5728557e1ef3fd017c53 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Schnelle Date: Wed, 30 Mar 2022 10:43:28 +0200 Subject: entry: Fix compile error in dynamic_irqentry_exit_cond_resched() MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit kernel/entry/common.c: In function ‘dynamic_irqentry_exit_cond_resched’: kernel/entry/common.c:409:14: error: implicit declaration of function ‘static_key_unlikely’; did you mean ‘static_key_enable’? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration] 409 | if (!static_key_unlikely(&sk_dynamic_irqentry_exit_cond_resched)) | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | static_key_enable static_key_unlikely() should be static_branch_unlikely(). Fixes: 99cf983cc8bca ("sched/preempt: Add PREEMPT_DYNAMIC using static keys") Signed-off-by: Sven Schnelle Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220330084328.1805665-1-svens@linux.ibm.com --- kernel/entry/common.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/entry/common.c b/kernel/entry/common.c index e57a224d6b79..93c3b86e781c 100644 --- a/kernel/entry/common.c +++ b/kernel/entry/common.c @@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_CALL(irqentry_exit_cond_resched, raw_irqentry_exit_cond_resched); DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(sk_dynamic_irqentry_exit_cond_resched); void dynamic_irqentry_exit_cond_resched(void) { - if (!static_key_unlikely(&sk_dynamic_irqentry_exit_cond_resched)) + if (!static_branch_unlikely(&sk_dynamic_irqentry_exit_cond_resched)) return; raw_irqentry_exit_cond_resched(); } -- cgit From 8fd4ddda2f49a66bf5dd3d0c01966c4b1971308b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christophe Leroy Date: Mon, 14 Mar 2022 12:49:36 +0100 Subject: static_call: Don't make __static_call_return0 static System.map shows that vmlinux contains several instances of __static_call_return0(): c0004fc0 t __static_call_return0 c0011518 t __static_call_return0 c00d8160 t __static_call_return0 arch_static_call_transform() uses the middle one to check whether we are setting a call to __static_call_return0 or not: c0011520 : c0011520: 3d 20 c0 01 lis r9,-16383 <== r9 = 0xc001 << 16 c0011524: 39 29 15 18 addi r9,r9,5400 <== r9 += 0x1518 c0011528: 7c 05 48 00 cmpw r5,r9 <== r9 has value 0xc0011518 here So if static_call_update() is called with one of the other instances of __static_call_return0(), arch_static_call_transform() won't recognise it. In order to work properly, global single instance of __static_call_return0() is required. Fixes: 3f2a8fc4b15d ("static_call/x86: Add __static_call_return0()") Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/30821468a0e7d28251954b578e5051dc09300d04.1647258493.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu --- kernel/Makefile | 3 +- kernel/static_call.c | 541 ------------------------------------------- kernel/static_call_inline.c | 543 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 545 insertions(+), 542 deletions(-) create mode 100644 kernel/static_call_inline.c (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile index 471d71935e90..847a82bfe0e3 100644 --- a/kernel/Makefile +++ b/kernel/Makefile @@ -114,7 +114,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_PM) += cpu_pm.o obj-$(CONFIG_BPF) += bpf/ obj-$(CONFIG_KCSAN) += kcsan/ obj-$(CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK) += scs.o -obj-$(CONFIG_HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE) += static_call.o +obj-$(CONFIG_HAVE_STATIC_CALL) += static_call.o +obj-$(CONFIG_HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE) += static_call_inline.o obj-$(CONFIG_CFI_CLANG) += cfi.o obj-$(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS) += events/ diff --git a/kernel/static_call.c b/kernel/static_call.c index f2b8baea35d2..e9c3e69f3837 100644 --- a/kernel/static_call.c +++ b/kernel/static_call.c @@ -1,549 +1,8 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -#include #include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include - -extern struct static_call_site __start_static_call_sites[], - __stop_static_call_sites[]; -extern struct static_call_tramp_key __start_static_call_tramp_key[], - __stop_static_call_tramp_key[]; - -static bool static_call_initialized; - -/* mutex to protect key modules/sites */ -static DEFINE_MUTEX(static_call_mutex); - -static void static_call_lock(void) -{ - mutex_lock(&static_call_mutex); -} - -static void static_call_unlock(void) -{ - mutex_unlock(&static_call_mutex); -} - -static inline void *static_call_addr(struct static_call_site *site) -{ - return (void *)((long)site->addr + (long)&site->addr); -} - -static inline unsigned long __static_call_key(const struct static_call_site *site) -{ - return (long)site->key + (long)&site->key; -} - -static inline struct static_call_key *static_call_key(const struct static_call_site *site) -{ - return (void *)(__static_call_key(site) & ~STATIC_CALL_SITE_FLAGS); -} - -/* These assume the key is word-aligned. */ -static inline bool static_call_is_init(struct static_call_site *site) -{ - return __static_call_key(site) & STATIC_CALL_SITE_INIT; -} - -static inline bool static_call_is_tail(struct static_call_site *site) -{ - return __static_call_key(site) & STATIC_CALL_SITE_TAIL; -} - -static inline void static_call_set_init(struct static_call_site *site) -{ - site->key = (__static_call_key(site) | STATIC_CALL_SITE_INIT) - - (long)&site->key; -} - -static int static_call_site_cmp(const void *_a, const void *_b) -{ - const struct static_call_site *a = _a; - const struct static_call_site *b = _b; - const struct static_call_key *key_a = static_call_key(a); - const struct static_call_key *key_b = static_call_key(b); - - if (key_a < key_b) - return -1; - - if (key_a > key_b) - return 1; - - return 0; -} - -static void static_call_site_swap(void *_a, void *_b, int size) -{ - long delta = (unsigned long)_a - (unsigned long)_b; - struct static_call_site *a = _a; - struct static_call_site *b = _b; - struct static_call_site tmp = *a; - - a->addr = b->addr - delta; - a->key = b->key - delta; - - b->addr = tmp.addr + delta; - b->key = tmp.key + delta; -} - -static inline void static_call_sort_entries(struct static_call_site *start, - struct static_call_site *stop) -{ - sort(start, stop - start, sizeof(struct static_call_site), - static_call_site_cmp, static_call_site_swap); -} - -static inline bool static_call_key_has_mods(struct static_call_key *key) -{ - return !(key->type & 1); -} - -static inline struct static_call_mod *static_call_key_next(struct static_call_key *key) -{ - if (!static_call_key_has_mods(key)) - return NULL; - - return key->mods; -} - -static inline struct static_call_site *static_call_key_sites(struct static_call_key *key) -{ - if (static_call_key_has_mods(key)) - return NULL; - - return (struct static_call_site *)(key->type & ~1); -} - -void __static_call_update(struct static_call_key *key, void *tramp, void *func) -{ - struct static_call_site *site, *stop; - struct static_call_mod *site_mod, first; - - cpus_read_lock(); - static_call_lock(); - - if (key->func == func) - goto done; - - key->func = func; - - arch_static_call_transform(NULL, tramp, func, false); - - /* - * If uninitialized, we'll not update the callsites, but they still - * point to the trampoline and we just patched that. - */ - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!static_call_initialized)) - goto done; - - first = (struct static_call_mod){ - .next = static_call_key_next(key), - .mod = NULL, - .sites = static_call_key_sites(key), - }; - - for (site_mod = &first; site_mod; site_mod = site_mod->next) { - bool init = system_state < SYSTEM_RUNNING; - struct module *mod = site_mod->mod; - - if (!site_mod->sites) { - /* - * This can happen if the static call key is defined in - * a module which doesn't use it. - * - * It also happens in the has_mods case, where the - * 'first' entry has no sites associated with it. - */ - continue; - } - - stop = __stop_static_call_sites; - - if (mod) { -#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES - stop = mod->static_call_sites + - mod->num_static_call_sites; - init = mod->state == MODULE_STATE_COMING; -#endif - } - - for (site = site_mod->sites; - site < stop && static_call_key(site) == key; site++) { - void *site_addr = static_call_addr(site); - - if (!init && static_call_is_init(site)) - continue; - - if (!kernel_text_address((unsigned long)site_addr)) { - /* - * This skips patching built-in __exit, which - * is part of init_section_contains() but is - * not part of kernel_text_address(). - * - * Skipping built-in __exit is fine since it - * will never be executed. - */ - WARN_ONCE(!static_call_is_init(site), - "can't patch static call site at %pS", - site_addr); - continue; - } - - arch_static_call_transform(site_addr, NULL, func, - static_call_is_tail(site)); - } - } - -done: - static_call_unlock(); - cpus_read_unlock(); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__static_call_update); - -static int __static_call_init(struct module *mod, - struct static_call_site *start, - struct static_call_site *stop) -{ - struct static_call_site *site; - struct static_call_key *key, *prev_key = NULL; - struct static_call_mod *site_mod; - - if (start == stop) - return 0; - - static_call_sort_entries(start, stop); - - for (site = start; site < stop; site++) { - void *site_addr = static_call_addr(site); - - if ((mod && within_module_init((unsigned long)site_addr, mod)) || - (!mod && init_section_contains(site_addr, 1))) - static_call_set_init(site); - - key = static_call_key(site); - if (key != prev_key) { - prev_key = key; - - /* - * For vmlinux (!mod) avoid the allocation by storing - * the sites pointer in the key itself. Also see - * __static_call_update()'s @first. - * - * This allows architectures (eg. x86) to call - * static_call_init() before memory allocation works. - */ - if (!mod) { - key->sites = site; - key->type |= 1; - goto do_transform; - } - - site_mod = kzalloc(sizeof(*site_mod), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!site_mod) - return -ENOMEM; - - /* - * When the key has a direct sites pointer, extract - * that into an explicit struct static_call_mod, so we - * can have a list of modules. - */ - if (static_call_key_sites(key)) { - site_mod->mod = NULL; - site_mod->next = NULL; - site_mod->sites = static_call_key_sites(key); - - key->mods = site_mod; - - site_mod = kzalloc(sizeof(*site_mod), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!site_mod) - return -ENOMEM; - } - - site_mod->mod = mod; - site_mod->sites = site; - site_mod->next = static_call_key_next(key); - key->mods = site_mod; - } - -do_transform: - arch_static_call_transform(site_addr, NULL, key->func, - static_call_is_tail(site)); - } - - return 0; -} - -static int addr_conflict(struct static_call_site *site, void *start, void *end) -{ - unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)static_call_addr(site); - - if (addr <= (unsigned long)end && - addr + CALL_INSN_SIZE > (unsigned long)start) - return 1; - - return 0; -} - -static int __static_call_text_reserved(struct static_call_site *iter_start, - struct static_call_site *iter_stop, - void *start, void *end, bool init) -{ - struct static_call_site *iter = iter_start; - - while (iter < iter_stop) { - if (init || !static_call_is_init(iter)) { - if (addr_conflict(iter, start, end)) - return 1; - } - iter++; - } - - return 0; -} - -#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES - -static int __static_call_mod_text_reserved(void *start, void *end) -{ - struct module *mod; - int ret; - - preempt_disable(); - mod = __module_text_address((unsigned long)start); - WARN_ON_ONCE(__module_text_address((unsigned long)end) != mod); - if (!try_module_get(mod)) - mod = NULL; - preempt_enable(); - - if (!mod) - return 0; - - ret = __static_call_text_reserved(mod->static_call_sites, - mod->static_call_sites + mod->num_static_call_sites, - start, end, mod->state == MODULE_STATE_COMING); - - module_put(mod); - - return ret; -} - -static unsigned long tramp_key_lookup(unsigned long addr) -{ - struct static_call_tramp_key *start = __start_static_call_tramp_key; - struct static_call_tramp_key *stop = __stop_static_call_tramp_key; - struct static_call_tramp_key *tramp_key; - - for (tramp_key = start; tramp_key != stop; tramp_key++) { - unsigned long tramp; - - tramp = (long)tramp_key->tramp + (long)&tramp_key->tramp; - if (tramp == addr) - return (long)tramp_key->key + (long)&tramp_key->key; - } - - return 0; -} - -static int static_call_add_module(struct module *mod) -{ - struct static_call_site *start = mod->static_call_sites; - struct static_call_site *stop = start + mod->num_static_call_sites; - struct static_call_site *site; - - for (site = start; site != stop; site++) { - unsigned long s_key = __static_call_key(site); - unsigned long addr = s_key & ~STATIC_CALL_SITE_FLAGS; - unsigned long key; - - /* - * Is the key is exported, 'addr' points to the key, which - * means modules are allowed to call static_call_update() on - * it. - * - * Otherwise, the key isn't exported, and 'addr' points to the - * trampoline so we need to lookup the key. - * - * We go through this dance to prevent crazy modules from - * abusing sensitive static calls. - */ - if (!kernel_text_address(addr)) - continue; - - key = tramp_key_lookup(addr); - if (!key) { - pr_warn("Failed to fixup __raw_static_call() usage at: %ps\n", - static_call_addr(site)); - return -EINVAL; - } - - key |= s_key & STATIC_CALL_SITE_FLAGS; - site->key = key - (long)&site->key; - } - - return __static_call_init(mod, start, stop); -} - -static void static_call_del_module(struct module *mod) -{ - struct static_call_site *start = mod->static_call_sites; - struct static_call_site *stop = mod->static_call_sites + - mod->num_static_call_sites; - struct static_call_key *key, *prev_key = NULL; - struct static_call_mod *site_mod, **prev; - struct static_call_site *site; - - for (site = start; site < stop; site++) { - key = static_call_key(site); - if (key == prev_key) - continue; - - prev_key = key; - - for (prev = &key->mods, site_mod = key->mods; - site_mod && site_mod->mod != mod; - prev = &site_mod->next, site_mod = site_mod->next) - ; - - if (!site_mod) - continue; - - *prev = site_mod->next; - kfree(site_mod); - } -} - -static int static_call_module_notify(struct notifier_block *nb, - unsigned long val, void *data) -{ - struct module *mod = data; - int ret = 0; - - cpus_read_lock(); - static_call_lock(); - - switch (val) { - case MODULE_STATE_COMING: - ret = static_call_add_module(mod); - if (ret) { - WARN(1, "Failed to allocate memory for static calls"); - static_call_del_module(mod); - } - break; - case MODULE_STATE_GOING: - static_call_del_module(mod); - break; - } - - static_call_unlock(); - cpus_read_unlock(); - - return notifier_from_errno(ret); -} - -static struct notifier_block static_call_module_nb = { - .notifier_call = static_call_module_notify, -}; - -#else - -static inline int __static_call_mod_text_reserved(void *start, void *end) -{ - return 0; -} - -#endif /* CONFIG_MODULES */ - -int static_call_text_reserved(void *start, void *end) -{ - bool init = system_state < SYSTEM_RUNNING; - int ret = __static_call_text_reserved(__start_static_call_sites, - __stop_static_call_sites, start, end, init); - - if (ret) - return ret; - - return __static_call_mod_text_reserved(start, end); -} - -int __init static_call_init(void) -{ - int ret; - - if (static_call_initialized) - return 0; - - cpus_read_lock(); - static_call_lock(); - ret = __static_call_init(NULL, __start_static_call_sites, - __stop_static_call_sites); - static_call_unlock(); - cpus_read_unlock(); - - if (ret) { - pr_err("Failed to allocate memory for static_call!\n"); - BUG(); - } - - static_call_initialized = true; - -#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES - register_module_notifier(&static_call_module_nb); -#endif - return 0; -} -early_initcall(static_call_init); long __static_call_return0(void) { return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__static_call_return0); - -#ifdef CONFIG_STATIC_CALL_SELFTEST - -static int func_a(int x) -{ - return x+1; -} - -static int func_b(int x) -{ - return x+2; -} - -DEFINE_STATIC_CALL(sc_selftest, func_a); - -static struct static_call_data { - int (*func)(int); - int val; - int expect; -} static_call_data [] __initdata = { - { NULL, 2, 3 }, - { func_b, 2, 4 }, - { func_a, 2, 3 } -}; - -static int __init test_static_call_init(void) -{ - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(static_call_data); i++ ) { - struct static_call_data *scd = &static_call_data[i]; - - if (scd->func) - static_call_update(sc_selftest, scd->func); - - WARN_ON(static_call(sc_selftest)(scd->val) != scd->expect); - } - - return 0; -} -early_initcall(test_static_call_init); - -#endif /* CONFIG_STATIC_CALL_SELFTEST */ diff --git a/kernel/static_call_inline.c b/kernel/static_call_inline.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..dc5665b62814 --- /dev/null +++ b/kernel/static_call_inline.c @@ -0,0 +1,543 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +extern struct static_call_site __start_static_call_sites[], + __stop_static_call_sites[]; +extern struct static_call_tramp_key __start_static_call_tramp_key[], + __stop_static_call_tramp_key[]; + +static bool static_call_initialized; + +/* mutex to protect key modules/sites */ +static DEFINE_MUTEX(static_call_mutex); + +static void static_call_lock(void) +{ + mutex_lock(&static_call_mutex); +} + +static void static_call_unlock(void) +{ + mutex_unlock(&static_call_mutex); +} + +static inline void *static_call_addr(struct static_call_site *site) +{ + return (void *)((long)site->addr + (long)&site->addr); +} + +static inline unsigned long __static_call_key(const struct static_call_site *site) +{ + return (long)site->key + (long)&site->key; +} + +static inline struct static_call_key *static_call_key(const struct static_call_site *site) +{ + return (void *)(__static_call_key(site) & ~STATIC_CALL_SITE_FLAGS); +} + +/* These assume the key is word-aligned. */ +static inline bool static_call_is_init(struct static_call_site *site) +{ + return __static_call_key(site) & STATIC_CALL_SITE_INIT; +} + +static inline bool static_call_is_tail(struct static_call_site *site) +{ + return __static_call_key(site) & STATIC_CALL_SITE_TAIL; +} + +static inline void static_call_set_init(struct static_call_site *site) +{ + site->key = (__static_call_key(site) | STATIC_CALL_SITE_INIT) - + (long)&site->key; +} + +static int static_call_site_cmp(const void *_a, const void *_b) +{ + const struct static_call_site *a = _a; + const struct static_call_site *b = _b; + const struct static_call_key *key_a = static_call_key(a); + const struct static_call_key *key_b = static_call_key(b); + + if (key_a < key_b) + return -1; + + if (key_a > key_b) + return 1; + + return 0; +} + +static void static_call_site_swap(void *_a, void *_b, int size) +{ + long delta = (unsigned long)_a - (unsigned long)_b; + struct static_call_site *a = _a; + struct static_call_site *b = _b; + struct static_call_site tmp = *a; + + a->addr = b->addr - delta; + a->key = b->key - delta; + + b->addr = tmp.addr + delta; + b->key = tmp.key + delta; +} + +static inline void static_call_sort_entries(struct static_call_site *start, + struct static_call_site *stop) +{ + sort(start, stop - start, sizeof(struct static_call_site), + static_call_site_cmp, static_call_site_swap); +} + +static inline bool static_call_key_has_mods(struct static_call_key *key) +{ + return !(key->type & 1); +} + +static inline struct static_call_mod *static_call_key_next(struct static_call_key *key) +{ + if (!static_call_key_has_mods(key)) + return NULL; + + return key->mods; +} + +static inline struct static_call_site *static_call_key_sites(struct static_call_key *key) +{ + if (static_call_key_has_mods(key)) + return NULL; + + return (struct static_call_site *)(key->type & ~1); +} + +void __static_call_update(struct static_call_key *key, void *tramp, void *func) +{ + struct static_call_site *site, *stop; + struct static_call_mod *site_mod, first; + + cpus_read_lock(); + static_call_lock(); + + if (key->func == func) + goto done; + + key->func = func; + + arch_static_call_transform(NULL, tramp, func, false); + + /* + * If uninitialized, we'll not update the callsites, but they still + * point to the trampoline and we just patched that. + */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!static_call_initialized)) + goto done; + + first = (struct static_call_mod){ + .next = static_call_key_next(key), + .mod = NULL, + .sites = static_call_key_sites(key), + }; + + for (site_mod = &first; site_mod; site_mod = site_mod->next) { + bool init = system_state < SYSTEM_RUNNING; + struct module *mod = site_mod->mod; + + if (!site_mod->sites) { + /* + * This can happen if the static call key is defined in + * a module which doesn't use it. + * + * It also happens in the has_mods case, where the + * 'first' entry has no sites associated with it. + */ + continue; + } + + stop = __stop_static_call_sites; + + if (mod) { +#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES + stop = mod->static_call_sites + + mod->num_static_call_sites; + init = mod->state == MODULE_STATE_COMING; +#endif + } + + for (site = site_mod->sites; + site < stop && static_call_key(site) == key; site++) { + void *site_addr = static_call_addr(site); + + if (!init && static_call_is_init(site)) + continue; + + if (!kernel_text_address((unsigned long)site_addr)) { + /* + * This skips patching built-in __exit, which + * is part of init_section_contains() but is + * not part of kernel_text_address(). + * + * Skipping built-in __exit is fine since it + * will never be executed. + */ + WARN_ONCE(!static_call_is_init(site), + "can't patch static call site at %pS", + site_addr); + continue; + } + + arch_static_call_transform(site_addr, NULL, func, + static_call_is_tail(site)); + } + } + +done: + static_call_unlock(); + cpus_read_unlock(); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__static_call_update); + +static int __static_call_init(struct module *mod, + struct static_call_site *start, + struct static_call_site *stop) +{ + struct static_call_site *site; + struct static_call_key *key, *prev_key = NULL; + struct static_call_mod *site_mod; + + if (start == stop) + return 0; + + static_call_sort_entries(start, stop); + + for (site = start; site < stop; site++) { + void *site_addr = static_call_addr(site); + + if ((mod && within_module_init((unsigned long)site_addr, mod)) || + (!mod && init_section_contains(site_addr, 1))) + static_call_set_init(site); + + key = static_call_key(site); + if (key != prev_key) { + prev_key = key; + + /* + * For vmlinux (!mod) avoid the allocation by storing + * the sites pointer in the key itself. Also see + * __static_call_update()'s @first. + * + * This allows architectures (eg. x86) to call + * static_call_init() before memory allocation works. + */ + if (!mod) { + key->sites = site; + key->type |= 1; + goto do_transform; + } + + site_mod = kzalloc(sizeof(*site_mod), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!site_mod) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* + * When the key has a direct sites pointer, extract + * that into an explicit struct static_call_mod, so we + * can have a list of modules. + */ + if (static_call_key_sites(key)) { + site_mod->mod = NULL; + site_mod->next = NULL; + site_mod->sites = static_call_key_sites(key); + + key->mods = site_mod; + + site_mod = kzalloc(sizeof(*site_mod), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!site_mod) + return -ENOMEM; + } + + site_mod->mod = mod; + site_mod->sites = site; + site_mod->next = static_call_key_next(key); + key->mods = site_mod; + } + +do_transform: + arch_static_call_transform(site_addr, NULL, key->func, + static_call_is_tail(site)); + } + + return 0; +} + +static int addr_conflict(struct static_call_site *site, void *start, void *end) +{ + unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)static_call_addr(site); + + if (addr <= (unsigned long)end && + addr + CALL_INSN_SIZE > (unsigned long)start) + return 1; + + return 0; +} + +static int __static_call_text_reserved(struct static_call_site *iter_start, + struct static_call_site *iter_stop, + void *start, void *end, bool init) +{ + struct static_call_site *iter = iter_start; + + while (iter < iter_stop) { + if (init || !static_call_is_init(iter)) { + if (addr_conflict(iter, start, end)) + return 1; + } + iter++; + } + + return 0; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES + +static int __static_call_mod_text_reserved(void *start, void *end) +{ + struct module *mod; + int ret; + + preempt_disable(); + mod = __module_text_address((unsigned long)start); + WARN_ON_ONCE(__module_text_address((unsigned long)end) != mod); + if (!try_module_get(mod)) + mod = NULL; + preempt_enable(); + + if (!mod) + return 0; + + ret = __static_call_text_reserved(mod->static_call_sites, + mod->static_call_sites + mod->num_static_call_sites, + start, end, mod->state == MODULE_STATE_COMING); + + module_put(mod); + + return ret; +} + +static unsigned long tramp_key_lookup(unsigned long addr) +{ + struct static_call_tramp_key *start = __start_static_call_tramp_key; + struct static_call_tramp_key *stop = __stop_static_call_tramp_key; + struct static_call_tramp_key *tramp_key; + + for (tramp_key = start; tramp_key != stop; tramp_key++) { + unsigned long tramp; + + tramp = (long)tramp_key->tramp + (long)&tramp_key->tramp; + if (tramp == addr) + return (long)tramp_key->key + (long)&tramp_key->key; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int static_call_add_module(struct module *mod) +{ + struct static_call_site *start = mod->static_call_sites; + struct static_call_site *stop = start + mod->num_static_call_sites; + struct static_call_site *site; + + for (site = start; site != stop; site++) { + unsigned long s_key = __static_call_key(site); + unsigned long addr = s_key & ~STATIC_CALL_SITE_FLAGS; + unsigned long key; + + /* + * Is the key is exported, 'addr' points to the key, which + * means modules are allowed to call static_call_update() on + * it. + * + * Otherwise, the key isn't exported, and 'addr' points to the + * trampoline so we need to lookup the key. + * + * We go through this dance to prevent crazy modules from + * abusing sensitive static calls. + */ + if (!kernel_text_address(addr)) + continue; + + key = tramp_key_lookup(addr); + if (!key) { + pr_warn("Failed to fixup __raw_static_call() usage at: %ps\n", + static_call_addr(site)); + return -EINVAL; + } + + key |= s_key & STATIC_CALL_SITE_FLAGS; + site->key = key - (long)&site->key; + } + + return __static_call_init(mod, start, stop); +} + +static void static_call_del_module(struct module *mod) +{ + struct static_call_site *start = mod->static_call_sites; + struct static_call_site *stop = mod->static_call_sites + + mod->num_static_call_sites; + struct static_call_key *key, *prev_key = NULL; + struct static_call_mod *site_mod, **prev; + struct static_call_site *site; + + for (site = start; site < stop; site++) { + key = static_call_key(site); + if (key == prev_key) + continue; + + prev_key = key; + + for (prev = &key->mods, site_mod = key->mods; + site_mod && site_mod->mod != mod; + prev = &site_mod->next, site_mod = site_mod->next) + ; + + if (!site_mod) + continue; + + *prev = site_mod->next; + kfree(site_mod); + } +} + +static int static_call_module_notify(struct notifier_block *nb, + unsigned long val, void *data) +{ + struct module *mod = data; + int ret = 0; + + cpus_read_lock(); + static_call_lock(); + + switch (val) { + case MODULE_STATE_COMING: + ret = static_call_add_module(mod); + if (ret) { + WARN(1, "Failed to allocate memory for static calls"); + static_call_del_module(mod); + } + break; + case MODULE_STATE_GOING: + static_call_del_module(mod); + break; + } + + static_call_unlock(); + cpus_read_unlock(); + + return notifier_from_errno(ret); +} + +static struct notifier_block static_call_module_nb = { + .notifier_call = static_call_module_notify, +}; + +#else + +static inline int __static_call_mod_text_reserved(void *start, void *end) +{ + return 0; +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_MODULES */ + +int static_call_text_reserved(void *start, void *end) +{ + bool init = system_state < SYSTEM_RUNNING; + int ret = __static_call_text_reserved(__start_static_call_sites, + __stop_static_call_sites, start, end, init); + + if (ret) + return ret; + + return __static_call_mod_text_reserved(start, end); +} + +int __init static_call_init(void) +{ + int ret; + + if (static_call_initialized) + return 0; + + cpus_read_lock(); + static_call_lock(); + ret = __static_call_init(NULL, __start_static_call_sites, + __stop_static_call_sites); + static_call_unlock(); + cpus_read_unlock(); + + if (ret) { + pr_err("Failed to allocate memory for static_call!\n"); + BUG(); + } + + static_call_initialized = true; + +#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES + register_module_notifier(&static_call_module_nb); +#endif + return 0; +} +early_initcall(static_call_init); + +#ifdef CONFIG_STATIC_CALL_SELFTEST + +static int func_a(int x) +{ + return x+1; +} + +static int func_b(int x) +{ + return x+2; +} + +DEFINE_STATIC_CALL(sc_selftest, func_a); + +static struct static_call_data { + int (*func)(int); + int val; + int expect; +} static_call_data [] __initdata = { + { NULL, 2, 3 }, + { func_b, 2, 4 }, + { func_a, 2, 3 } +}; + +static int __init test_static_call_init(void) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(static_call_data); i++ ) { + struct static_call_data *scd = &static_call_data[i]; + + if (scd->func) + static_call_update(sc_selftest, scd->func); + + WARN_ON(static_call(sc_selftest)(scd->val) != scd->expect); + } + + return 0; +} +early_initcall(test_static_call_init); + +#endif /* CONFIG_STATIC_CALL_SELFTEST */ -- cgit From e3265a4386428d3d157d9565bb520aabff8b4bf0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Namhyung Kim Date: Mon, 28 Mar 2022 13:01:12 -0700 Subject: perf/core: Inherit event_caps It was reported that some perf event setup can make fork failed on ARM64. It was the case of a group of mixed hw and sw events and it failed in perf_event_init_task() due to armpmu_event_init(). The ARM PMU code checks if all the events in a group belong to the same PMU except for software events. But it didn't set the event_caps of inherited events and no longer identify them as software events. Therefore the test failed in a child process. A simple reproducer is: $ perf stat -e '{cycles,cs,instructions}' perf bench sched messaging # Running 'sched/messaging' benchmark: perf: fork(): Invalid argument The perf stat was fine but the perf bench failed in fork(). Let's inherit the event caps from the parent. Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220328200112.457740-1-namhyung@kernel.org --- kernel/events/core.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index cfde994ce61c..3980efcf931d 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -11635,6 +11635,9 @@ perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int cpu, event->state = PERF_EVENT_STATE_INACTIVE; + if (parent_event) + event->event_caps = parent_event->event_caps; + if (event->attr.sigtrap) atomic_set(&event->event_limit, 1); -- cgit From a0827713e298d021d3c79ae7423aea408f3f7c3a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chengming Zhou Date: Tue, 29 Mar 2022 23:45:20 +0800 Subject: perf/core: Don't pass task around when ctx sched in The current code pass task around for ctx_sched_in(), only to get perf_cgroup of the task, then update the timestamp of it and its ancestors and set them to active. But we can use cpuctx->cgrp to get active perf_cgroup and its ancestors since cpuctx->cgrp has been set before ctx_sched_in(). This patch remove the task argument in ctx_sched_in() and cleanup related code. Signed-off-by: Chengming Zhou Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220329154523.86438-2-zhouchengming@bytedance.com --- kernel/events/core.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index 3980efcf931d..65450200691c 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -574,8 +574,7 @@ static void cpu_ctx_sched_out(struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx, enum event_type_t event_type); static void cpu_ctx_sched_in(struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx, - enum event_type_t event_type, - struct task_struct *task); + enum event_type_t event_type); static void update_context_time(struct perf_event_context *ctx); static u64 perf_event_time(struct perf_event *event); @@ -801,10 +800,10 @@ static inline void update_cgrp_time_from_event(struct perf_event *event) } static inline void -perf_cgroup_set_timestamp(struct task_struct *task, - struct perf_event_context *ctx) +perf_cgroup_set_timestamp(struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx) { - struct perf_cgroup *cgrp; + struct perf_event_context *ctx = &cpuctx->ctx; + struct perf_cgroup *cgrp = cpuctx->cgrp; struct perf_cgroup_info *info; struct cgroup_subsys_state *css; @@ -813,10 +812,10 @@ perf_cgroup_set_timestamp(struct task_struct *task, * ensure we do not access cgroup data * unless we have the cgroup pinned (css_get) */ - if (!task || !ctx->nr_cgroups) + if (!cgrp) return; - cgrp = perf_cgroup_from_task(task, ctx); + WARN_ON_ONCE(!ctx->nr_cgroups); for (css = &cgrp->css; css; css = css->parent) { cgrp = container_of(css, struct perf_cgroup, css); @@ -869,14 +868,14 @@ static void perf_cgroup_switch(struct task_struct *task, int mode) WARN_ON_ONCE(cpuctx->cgrp); /* * set cgrp before ctxsw in to allow - * event_filter_match() to not have to pass - * task around + * perf_cgroup_set_timestamp() in ctx_sched_in() + * to not have to pass task around * we pass the cpuctx->ctx to perf_cgroup_from_task() * because cgorup events are only per-cpu */ cpuctx->cgrp = perf_cgroup_from_task(task, &cpuctx->ctx); - cpu_ctx_sched_in(cpuctx, EVENT_ALL, task); + cpu_ctx_sched_in(cpuctx, EVENT_ALL); } perf_pmu_enable(cpuctx->ctx.pmu); perf_ctx_unlock(cpuctx, cpuctx->task_ctx); @@ -1118,8 +1117,7 @@ static inline int perf_cgroup_connect(pid_t pid, struct perf_event *event, } static inline void -perf_cgroup_set_timestamp(struct task_struct *task, - struct perf_event_context *ctx) +perf_cgroup_set_timestamp(struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx) { } @@ -2713,8 +2711,7 @@ static void ctx_sched_out(struct perf_event_context *ctx, static void ctx_sched_in(struct perf_event_context *ctx, struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx, - enum event_type_t event_type, - struct task_struct *task); + enum event_type_t event_type); static void task_ctx_sched_out(struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx, struct perf_event_context *ctx, @@ -2730,15 +2727,14 @@ static void task_ctx_sched_out(struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx, } static void perf_event_sched_in(struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx, - struct perf_event_context *ctx, - struct task_struct *task) + struct perf_event_context *ctx) { - cpu_ctx_sched_in(cpuctx, EVENT_PINNED, task); + cpu_ctx_sched_in(cpuctx, EVENT_PINNED); if (ctx) - ctx_sched_in(ctx, cpuctx, EVENT_PINNED, task); - cpu_ctx_sched_in(cpuctx, EVENT_FLEXIBLE, task); + ctx_sched_in(ctx, cpuctx, EVENT_PINNED); + cpu_ctx_sched_in(cpuctx, EVENT_FLEXIBLE); if (ctx) - ctx_sched_in(ctx, cpuctx, EVENT_FLEXIBLE, task); + ctx_sched_in(ctx, cpuctx, EVENT_FLEXIBLE); } /* @@ -2788,7 +2784,7 @@ static void ctx_resched(struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx, else if (ctx_event_type & EVENT_PINNED) cpu_ctx_sched_out(cpuctx, EVENT_FLEXIBLE); - perf_event_sched_in(cpuctx, task_ctx, current); + perf_event_sched_in(cpuctx, task_ctx); perf_pmu_enable(cpuctx->ctx.pmu); } @@ -3011,7 +3007,7 @@ static void __perf_event_enable(struct perf_event *event, return; if (!event_filter_match(event)) { - ctx_sched_in(ctx, cpuctx, EVENT_TIME, current); + ctx_sched_in(ctx, cpuctx, EVENT_TIME); return; } @@ -3020,7 +3016,7 @@ static void __perf_event_enable(struct perf_event *event, * then don't put it on unless the group is on. */ if (leader != event && leader->state != PERF_EVENT_STATE_ACTIVE) { - ctx_sched_in(ctx, cpuctx, EVENT_TIME, current); + ctx_sched_in(ctx, cpuctx, EVENT_TIME); return; } @@ -3865,8 +3861,7 @@ ctx_flexible_sched_in(struct perf_event_context *ctx, static void ctx_sched_in(struct perf_event_context *ctx, struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx, - enum event_type_t event_type, - struct task_struct *task) + enum event_type_t event_type) { int is_active = ctx->is_active; @@ -3878,7 +3873,7 @@ ctx_sched_in(struct perf_event_context *ctx, if (is_active ^ EVENT_TIME) { /* start ctx time */ __update_context_time(ctx, false); - perf_cgroup_set_timestamp(task, ctx); + perf_cgroup_set_timestamp(cpuctx); /* * CPU-release for the below ->is_active store, * see __load_acquire() in perf_event_time_now() @@ -3909,12 +3904,11 @@ ctx_sched_in(struct perf_event_context *ctx, } static void cpu_ctx_sched_in(struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx, - enum event_type_t event_type, - struct task_struct *task) + enum event_type_t event_type) { struct perf_event_context *ctx = &cpuctx->ctx; - ctx_sched_in(ctx, cpuctx, event_type, task); + ctx_sched_in(ctx, cpuctx, event_type); } static void perf_event_context_sched_in(struct perf_event_context *ctx, @@ -3956,7 +3950,7 @@ static void perf_event_context_sched_in(struct perf_event_context *ctx, */ if (!RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&ctx->pinned_groups.tree)) cpu_ctx_sched_out(cpuctx, EVENT_FLEXIBLE); - perf_event_sched_in(cpuctx, ctx, task); + perf_event_sched_in(cpuctx, ctx); if (cpuctx->sched_cb_usage && pmu->sched_task) pmu->sched_task(cpuctx->task_ctx, true); @@ -4267,7 +4261,7 @@ static bool perf_rotate_context(struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx) if (cpu_event) rotate_ctx(&cpuctx->ctx, cpu_event); - perf_event_sched_in(cpuctx, task_ctx, current); + perf_event_sched_in(cpuctx, task_ctx); perf_pmu_enable(cpuctx->ctx.pmu); perf_ctx_unlock(cpuctx, cpuctx->task_ctx); @@ -4339,7 +4333,7 @@ static void perf_event_enable_on_exec(int ctxn) clone_ctx = unclone_ctx(ctx); ctx_resched(cpuctx, ctx, event_type); } else { - ctx_sched_in(ctx, cpuctx, EVENT_TIME, current); + ctx_sched_in(ctx, cpuctx, EVENT_TIME); } perf_ctx_unlock(cpuctx, ctx); -- cgit From 6875186aea5ce09a644758d9193265da1cc187c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chengming Zhou Date: Tue, 29 Mar 2022 23:45:21 +0800 Subject: perf/core: Use perf_cgroup_info->active to check if cgroup is active Since we use perf_cgroup_set_timestamp() to start cgroup time and set active to 1, then use update_cgrp_time_from_cpuctx() to stop cgroup time and set active to 0. We can use info->active directly to check if cgroup is active. Signed-off-by: Chengming Zhou Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220329154523.86438-3-zhouchengming@bytedance.com --- kernel/events/core.c | 7 ++----- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index 65450200691c..a08fb92b3934 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -780,7 +780,6 @@ static inline void update_cgrp_time_from_cpuctx(struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx, static inline void update_cgrp_time_from_event(struct perf_event *event) { struct perf_cgroup_info *info; - struct perf_cgroup *cgrp; /* * ensure we access cgroup data only when needed and @@ -789,14 +788,12 @@ static inline void update_cgrp_time_from_event(struct perf_event *event) if (!is_cgroup_event(event)) return; - cgrp = perf_cgroup_from_task(current, event->ctx); + info = this_cpu_ptr(event->cgrp->info); /* * Do not update time when cgroup is not active */ - if (cgroup_is_descendant(cgrp->css.cgroup, event->cgrp->css.cgroup)) { - info = this_cpu_ptr(event->cgrp->info); + if (info->active) __update_cgrp_time(info, perf_clock(), true); - } } static inline void -- cgit From 96492a6c558acb56124844d1409d9ef8624a0322 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chengming Zhou Date: Tue, 29 Mar 2022 23:45:22 +0800 Subject: perf/core: Fix perf_cgroup_switch() There is a race problem that can trigger WARN_ON_ONCE(cpuctx->cgrp) in perf_cgroup_switch(). CPU1 CPU2 perf_cgroup_sched_out(prev, next) cgrp1 = perf_cgroup_from_task(prev) cgrp2 = perf_cgroup_from_task(next) if (cgrp1 != cgrp2) perf_cgroup_switch(prev, PERF_CGROUP_SWOUT) cgroup_migrate_execute() task->cgroups = ? perf_cgroup_attach() task_function_call(task, __perf_cgroup_move) perf_cgroup_sched_in(prev, next) cgrp1 = perf_cgroup_from_task(prev) cgrp2 = perf_cgroup_from_task(next) if (cgrp1 != cgrp2) perf_cgroup_switch(next, PERF_CGROUP_SWIN) __perf_cgroup_move() perf_cgroup_switch(task, PERF_CGROUP_SWOUT | PERF_CGROUP_SWIN) The commit a8d757ef076f ("perf events: Fix slow and broken cgroup context switch code") want to skip perf_cgroup_switch() when the perf_cgroup of "prev" and "next" are the same. But task->cgroups can change in concurrent with context_switch() in cgroup_migrate_execute(). If cgrp1 == cgrp2 in sched_out(), cpuctx won't do sched_out. Then task->cgroups changed cause cgrp1 != cgrp2 in sched_in(), cpuctx will do sched_in. So trigger WARN_ON_ONCE(cpuctx->cgrp). Even though __perf_cgroup_move() will be synchronized as the context switch disables the interrupt, context_switch() still can see the task->cgroups is changing in the middle, since task->cgroups changed before sending IPI. So we have to combine perf_cgroup_sched_in() into perf_cgroup_sched_out(), unified into perf_cgroup_switch(), to fix the incosistency between perf_cgroup_sched_out() and perf_cgroup_sched_in(). But we can't just compare prev->cgroups with next->cgroups to decide whether to skip cpuctx sched_out/in since the prev->cgroups is changing too. For example: CPU1 CPU2 cgroup_migrate_execute() prev->cgroups = ? perf_cgroup_attach() task_function_call(task, __perf_cgroup_move) perf_cgroup_switch(task) cgrp1 = perf_cgroup_from_task(prev) cgrp2 = perf_cgroup_from_task(next) if (cgrp1 != cgrp2) cpuctx sched_out/in ... task_function_call() will return -ESRCH In the above example, prev->cgroups changing cause (cgrp1 == cgrp2) to be true, so skip cpuctx sched_out/in. And later task_function_call() would return -ESRCH since the prev task isn't running on cpu anymore. So we would leave perf_events of the old prev->cgroups still sched on the CPU, which is wrong. The solution is that we should use cpuctx->cgrp to compare with the next task's perf_cgroup. Since cpuctx->cgrp can only be changed on local CPU, and we have irq disabled, we can read cpuctx->cgrp to compare without holding ctx lock. Fixes: a8d757ef076f ("perf events: Fix slow and broken cgroup context switch code") Signed-off-by: Chengming Zhou Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220329154523.86438-4-zhouchengming@bytedance.com --- kernel/events/core.c | 132 ++++++++++----------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 107 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index a08fb92b3934..bdeb41fe7f15 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -824,17 +824,12 @@ perf_cgroup_set_timestamp(struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx) static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct list_head, cgrp_cpuctx_list); -#define PERF_CGROUP_SWOUT 0x1 /* cgroup switch out every event */ -#define PERF_CGROUP_SWIN 0x2 /* cgroup switch in events based on task */ - /* * reschedule events based on the cgroup constraint of task. - * - * mode SWOUT : schedule out everything - * mode SWIN : schedule in based on cgroup for next */ -static void perf_cgroup_switch(struct task_struct *task, int mode) +static void perf_cgroup_switch(struct task_struct *task) { + struct perf_cgroup *cgrp; struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx, *tmp; struct list_head *list; unsigned long flags; @@ -845,35 +840,31 @@ static void perf_cgroup_switch(struct task_struct *task, int mode) */ local_irq_save(flags); + cgrp = perf_cgroup_from_task(task, NULL); + list = this_cpu_ptr(&cgrp_cpuctx_list); list_for_each_entry_safe(cpuctx, tmp, list, cgrp_cpuctx_entry) { WARN_ON_ONCE(cpuctx->ctx.nr_cgroups == 0); + if (READ_ONCE(cpuctx->cgrp) == cgrp) + continue; perf_ctx_lock(cpuctx, cpuctx->task_ctx); perf_pmu_disable(cpuctx->ctx.pmu); - if (mode & PERF_CGROUP_SWOUT) { - cpu_ctx_sched_out(cpuctx, EVENT_ALL); - /* - * must not be done before ctxswout due - * to event_filter_match() in event_sched_out() - */ - cpuctx->cgrp = NULL; - } + cpu_ctx_sched_out(cpuctx, EVENT_ALL); + /* + * must not be done before ctxswout due + * to update_cgrp_time_from_cpuctx() in + * ctx_sched_out() + */ + cpuctx->cgrp = cgrp; + /* + * set cgrp before ctxsw in to allow + * perf_cgroup_set_timestamp() in ctx_sched_in() + * to not have to pass task around + */ + cpu_ctx_sched_in(cpuctx, EVENT_ALL); - if (mode & PERF_CGROUP_SWIN) { - WARN_ON_ONCE(cpuctx->cgrp); - /* - * set cgrp before ctxsw in to allow - * perf_cgroup_set_timestamp() in ctx_sched_in() - * to not have to pass task around - * we pass the cpuctx->ctx to perf_cgroup_from_task() - * because cgorup events are only per-cpu - */ - cpuctx->cgrp = perf_cgroup_from_task(task, - &cpuctx->ctx); - cpu_ctx_sched_in(cpuctx, EVENT_ALL); - } perf_pmu_enable(cpuctx->ctx.pmu); perf_ctx_unlock(cpuctx, cpuctx->task_ctx); } @@ -881,58 +872,6 @@ static void perf_cgroup_switch(struct task_struct *task, int mode) local_irq_restore(flags); } -static inline void perf_cgroup_sched_out(struct task_struct *task, - struct task_struct *next) -{ - struct perf_cgroup *cgrp1; - struct perf_cgroup *cgrp2 = NULL; - - rcu_read_lock(); - /* - * we come here when we know perf_cgroup_events > 0 - * we do not need to pass the ctx here because we know - * we are holding the rcu lock - */ - cgrp1 = perf_cgroup_from_task(task, NULL); - cgrp2 = perf_cgroup_from_task(next, NULL); - - /* - * only schedule out current cgroup events if we know - * that we are switching to a different cgroup. Otherwise, - * do no touch the cgroup events. - */ - if (cgrp1 != cgrp2) - perf_cgroup_switch(task, PERF_CGROUP_SWOUT); - - rcu_read_unlock(); -} - -static inline void perf_cgroup_sched_in(struct task_struct *prev, - struct task_struct *task) -{ - struct perf_cgroup *cgrp1; - struct perf_cgroup *cgrp2 = NULL; - - rcu_read_lock(); - /* - * we come here when we know perf_cgroup_events > 0 - * we do not need to pass the ctx here because we know - * we are holding the rcu lock - */ - cgrp1 = perf_cgroup_from_task(task, NULL); - cgrp2 = perf_cgroup_from_task(prev, NULL); - - /* - * only need to schedule in cgroup events if we are changing - * cgroup during ctxsw. Cgroup events were not scheduled - * out of ctxsw out if that was not the case. - */ - if (cgrp1 != cgrp2) - perf_cgroup_switch(task, PERF_CGROUP_SWIN); - - rcu_read_unlock(); -} - static int perf_cgroup_ensure_storage(struct perf_event *event, struct cgroup_subsys_state *css) { @@ -1096,16 +1035,6 @@ static inline void update_cgrp_time_from_cpuctx(struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx, { } -static inline void perf_cgroup_sched_out(struct task_struct *task, - struct task_struct *next) -{ -} - -static inline void perf_cgroup_sched_in(struct task_struct *prev, - struct task_struct *task) -{ -} - static inline int perf_cgroup_connect(pid_t pid, struct perf_event *event, struct perf_event_attr *attr, struct perf_event *group_leader) @@ -1118,11 +1047,6 @@ perf_cgroup_set_timestamp(struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx) { } -static inline void -perf_cgroup_switch(struct task_struct *task, struct task_struct *next) -{ -} - static inline u64 perf_cgroup_event_time(struct perf_event *event) { return 0; @@ -1142,6 +1066,10 @@ static inline void perf_cgroup_event_disable(struct perf_event *event, struct perf_event_context *ctx) { } + +static void perf_cgroup_switch(struct task_struct *task) +{ +} #endif /* @@ -3661,7 +3589,7 @@ void __perf_event_task_sched_out(struct task_struct *task, * cgroup event are system-wide mode only */ if (atomic_read(this_cpu_ptr(&perf_cgroup_events))) - perf_cgroup_sched_out(task, next); + perf_cgroup_switch(next); } /* @@ -3975,16 +3903,6 @@ void __perf_event_task_sched_in(struct task_struct *prev, struct perf_event_context *ctx; int ctxn; - /* - * If cgroup events exist on this CPU, then we need to check if we have - * to switch in PMU state; cgroup event are system-wide mode only. - * - * Since cgroup events are CPU events, we must schedule these in before - * we schedule in the task events. - */ - if (atomic_read(this_cpu_ptr(&perf_cgroup_events))) - perf_cgroup_sched_in(prev, task); - for_each_task_context_nr(ctxn) { ctx = task->perf_event_ctxp[ctxn]; if (likely(!ctx)) @@ -13556,7 +13474,7 @@ static int __perf_cgroup_move(void *info) { struct task_struct *task = info; rcu_read_lock(); - perf_cgroup_switch(task, PERF_CGROUP_SWOUT | PERF_CGROUP_SWIN); + perf_cgroup_switch(task); rcu_read_unlock(); return 0; } -- cgit From e19cd0b6fa5938c51d7b928010d584f0de93913a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chengming Zhou Date: Tue, 29 Mar 2022 23:45:23 +0800 Subject: perf/core: Always set cpuctx cgrp when enable cgroup event When enable a cgroup event, cpuctx->cgrp setting is conditional on the current task cgrp matching the event's cgroup, so have to do it for every new event. It brings complexity but no advantage. To keep it simple, this patch would always set cpuctx->cgrp when enable the first cgroup event, and reset to NULL when disable the last cgroup event. Signed-off-by: Chengming Zhou Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220329154523.86438-5-zhouchengming@bytedance.com --- kernel/events/core.c | 18 ++---------------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index bdeb41fe7f15..23bb19716ad3 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -967,22 +967,10 @@ perf_cgroup_event_enable(struct perf_event *event, struct perf_event_context *ct */ cpuctx = container_of(ctx, struct perf_cpu_context, ctx); - /* - * Since setting cpuctx->cgrp is conditional on the current @cgrp - * matching the event's cgroup, we must do this for every new event, - * because if the first would mismatch, the second would not try again - * and we would leave cpuctx->cgrp unset. - */ - if (ctx->is_active && !cpuctx->cgrp) { - struct perf_cgroup *cgrp = perf_cgroup_from_task(current, ctx); - - if (cgroup_is_descendant(cgrp->css.cgroup, event->cgrp->css.cgroup)) - cpuctx->cgrp = cgrp; - } - if (ctx->nr_cgroups++) return; + cpuctx->cgrp = perf_cgroup_from_task(current, ctx); list_add(&cpuctx->cgrp_cpuctx_entry, per_cpu_ptr(&cgrp_cpuctx_list, event->cpu)); } @@ -1004,9 +992,7 @@ perf_cgroup_event_disable(struct perf_event *event, struct perf_event_context *c if (--ctx->nr_cgroups) return; - if (ctx->is_active && cpuctx->cgrp) - cpuctx->cgrp = NULL; - + cpuctx->cgrp = NULL; list_del(&cpuctx->cgrp_cpuctx_entry); } -- cgit From c54bc0fc84214b203f7a0ebfd1bd308ce2abe920 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anna-Maria Behnsen Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2022 21:17:32 +0200 Subject: timers: Fix warning condition in __run_timers() When the timer base is empty, base::next_expiry is set to base::clk + NEXT_TIMER_MAX_DELTA and base::next_expiry_recalc is false. When no timer is queued until jiffies reaches base::next_expiry value, the warning for not finding any expired timer and base::next_expiry_recalc is false in __run_timers() triggers. To prevent triggering the warning in this valid scenario base::timers_pending needs to be added to the warning condition. Fixes: 31cd0e119d50 ("timers: Recalculate next timer interrupt only when necessary") Reported-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Anna-Maria Behnsen Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220405191732.7438-3-anna-maria@linutronix.de --- kernel/time/timer.c | 11 +++++++---- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/time/timer.c b/kernel/time/timer.c index 85f1021ad459..9dd2a39cb3b0 100644 --- a/kernel/time/timer.c +++ b/kernel/time/timer.c @@ -1722,11 +1722,14 @@ static inline void __run_timers(struct timer_base *base) time_after_eq(jiffies, base->next_expiry)) { levels = collect_expired_timers(base, heads); /* - * The only possible reason for not finding any expired - * timer at this clk is that all matching timers have been - * dequeued. + * The two possible reasons for not finding any expired + * timer at this clk are that all matching timers have been + * dequeued or no timer has been queued since + * base::next_expiry was set to base::clk + + * NEXT_TIMER_MAX_DELTA. */ - WARN_ON_ONCE(!levels && !base->next_expiry_recalc); + WARN_ON_ONCE(!levels && !base->next_expiry_recalc + && base->timers_pending); base->clk++; base->next_expiry = __next_timer_interrupt(base); -- cgit From 40e97e42961f8c6cc7bd5fe67cc18417e02d78f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Gortmaker Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2021 09:59:50 -0500 Subject: tick/nohz: Use WARN_ON_ONCE() to prevent console saturation While running some testing on code that happened to allow the variable tick_nohz_full_running to get set but with no "possible" NOHZ cores to back up that setting, this warning triggered: if (unlikely(tick_do_timer_cpu == TICK_DO_TIMER_NONE)) WARN_ON(tick_nohz_full_running); The console was overwhemled with an endless stream of one WARN per tick per core and there was no way to even see what was going on w/o using a serial console to capture it and then trace it back to this. Change it to WARN_ON_ONCE(). Fixes: 08ae95f4fd3b ("nohz_full: Allow the boot CPU to be nohz_full") Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211206145950.10927-3-paul.gortmaker@windriver.com --- kernel/time/tick-sched.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/time/tick-sched.c b/kernel/time/tick-sched.c index 2d76c91b85de..3506f6ed790c 100644 --- a/kernel/time/tick-sched.c +++ b/kernel/time/tick-sched.c @@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ static void tick_sched_do_timer(struct tick_sched *ts, ktime_t now) */ if (unlikely(tick_do_timer_cpu == TICK_DO_TIMER_NONE)) { #ifdef CONFIG_NO_HZ_FULL - WARN_ON(tick_nohz_full_running); + WARN_ON_ONCE(tick_nohz_full_running); #endif tick_do_timer_cpu = cpu; } -- cgit From 9c95bc25ad3b1a2240cd1f896569292a57d3ce85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiapeng Chong Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 16:47:39 +0800 Subject: tick/sched: Fix non-kernel-doc comment Fixes the following W=1 kernel build warning: kernel/time/tick-sched.c:1563: warning: This comment starts with '/**', but isn't a kernel-doc comment. Reported-by: Abaci Robot Signed-off-by: Jiapeng Chong Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220214084739.63228-1-jiapeng.chong@linux.alibaba.com --- kernel/time/tick-sched.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/time/tick-sched.c b/kernel/time/tick-sched.c index 3506f6ed790c..d257721c68b8 100644 --- a/kernel/time/tick-sched.c +++ b/kernel/time/tick-sched.c @@ -1538,7 +1538,7 @@ void tick_cancel_sched_timer(int cpu) } #endif -/** +/* * Async notification about clocksource changes */ void tick_clock_notify(void) @@ -1559,7 +1559,7 @@ void tick_oneshot_notify(void) set_bit(0, &ts->check_clocks); } -/** +/* * Check, if a change happened, which makes oneshot possible. * * Called cyclic from the hrtimer softirq (driven by the timer -- cgit From 08d835dff916bfe8f45acc7b92c7af6c4081c8a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rei Yamamoto Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 09:33:09 +0900 Subject: genirq/affinity: Consider that CPUs on nodes can be unbalanced If CPUs on a node are offline at boot time, the number of nodes is different when building affinity masks for present cpus and when building affinity masks for possible cpus. This causes the following problem: In the case that the number of vectors is less than the number of nodes there are cases where bits of masks for present cpus are overwritten when building masks for possible cpus. Fix this by excluding CPUs, which are not part of the current build mask (present/possible). [ tglx: Massaged changelog and added comment ] Fixes: b82592199032 ("genirq/affinity: Spread IRQs to all available NUMA nodes") Signed-off-by: Rei Yamamoto Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Ming Lei Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220331003309.10891-1-yamamoto.rei@jp.fujitsu.com --- kernel/irq/affinity.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/irq/affinity.c b/kernel/irq/affinity.c index f7ff8919dc9b..fdf170404650 100644 --- a/kernel/irq/affinity.c +++ b/kernel/irq/affinity.c @@ -269,8 +269,9 @@ static int __irq_build_affinity_masks(unsigned int startvec, */ if (numvecs <= nodes) { for_each_node_mask(n, nodemsk) { - cpumask_or(&masks[curvec].mask, &masks[curvec].mask, - node_to_cpumask[n]); + /* Ensure that only CPUs which are in both masks are set */ + cpumask_and(nmsk, cpu_mask, node_to_cpumask[n]); + cpumask_or(&masks[curvec].mask, &masks[curvec].mask, nmsk); if (++curvec == last_affv) curvec = firstvec; } -- cgit From 9e949a3886356fe9112c6f6f34a6e23d1d35407f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nadav Amit Date: Sat, 19 Mar 2022 00:20:15 -0700 Subject: smp: Fix offline cpu check in flush_smp_call_function_queue() The check in flush_smp_call_function_queue() for callbacks that are sent to offline CPUs currently checks whether the queue is empty. However, flush_smp_call_function_queue() has just deleted all the callbacks from the queue and moved all the entries into a local list. This checks would only be positive if some callbacks were added in the short time after llist_del_all() was called. This does not seem to be the intention of this check. Change the check to look at the local list to which the entries were moved instead of the queue from which all the callbacks were just removed. Fixes: 8d056c48e4862 ("CPU hotplug, smp: flush any pending IPI callbacks before CPU offline") Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220319072015.1495036-1-namit@vmware.com --- kernel/smp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/smp.c b/kernel/smp.c index 01a7c1706a58..65a630f62363 100644 --- a/kernel/smp.c +++ b/kernel/smp.c @@ -579,7 +579,7 @@ static void flush_smp_call_function_queue(bool warn_cpu_offline) /* There shouldn't be any pending callbacks on an offline CPU. */ if (unlikely(warn_cpu_offline && !cpu_online(smp_processor_id()) && - !warned && !llist_empty(head))) { + !warned && entry != NULL)) { warned = true; WARN(1, "IPI on offline CPU %d\n", smp_processor_id()); -- cgit From b7ba6d8dc3569e49800ef0136799f26f43e237e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Price Date: Mon, 11 Apr 2022 16:22:32 +0100 Subject: cpu/hotplug: Remove the 'cpu' member of cpuhp_cpu_state Currently the setting of the 'cpu' member of struct cpuhp_cpu_state in cpuhp_create() is too late as it is used earlier in _cpu_up(). If kzalloc_node() in __smpboot_create_thread() fails then the rollback will be done with st->cpu==0 causing CPU0 to be erroneously set to be dying, causing the scheduler to get mightily confused and throw its toys out of the pram. However the cpu number is actually available directly, so simply remove the 'cpu' member and avoid the problem in the first place. Fixes: 2ea46c6fc945 ("cpumask/hotplug: Fix cpu_dying() state tracking") Signed-off-by: Steven Price Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220411152233.474129-2-steven.price@arm.com --- kernel/cpu.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c index 5797c2a7a93f..d0a9aa0b42e8 100644 --- a/kernel/cpu.c +++ b/kernel/cpu.c @@ -71,7 +71,6 @@ struct cpuhp_cpu_state { bool rollback; bool single; bool bringup; - int cpu; struct hlist_node *node; struct hlist_node *last; enum cpuhp_state cb_state; @@ -475,7 +474,7 @@ static inline bool cpu_smt_allowed(unsigned int cpu) { return true; } #endif static inline enum cpuhp_state -cpuhp_set_state(struct cpuhp_cpu_state *st, enum cpuhp_state target) +cpuhp_set_state(int cpu, struct cpuhp_cpu_state *st, enum cpuhp_state target) { enum cpuhp_state prev_state = st->state; bool bringup = st->state < target; @@ -486,14 +485,15 @@ cpuhp_set_state(struct cpuhp_cpu_state *st, enum cpuhp_state target) st->target = target; st->single = false; st->bringup = bringup; - if (cpu_dying(st->cpu) != !bringup) - set_cpu_dying(st->cpu, !bringup); + if (cpu_dying(cpu) != !bringup) + set_cpu_dying(cpu, !bringup); return prev_state; } static inline void -cpuhp_reset_state(struct cpuhp_cpu_state *st, enum cpuhp_state prev_state) +cpuhp_reset_state(int cpu, struct cpuhp_cpu_state *st, + enum cpuhp_state prev_state) { bool bringup = !st->bringup; @@ -520,8 +520,8 @@ cpuhp_reset_state(struct cpuhp_cpu_state *st, enum cpuhp_state prev_state) } st->bringup = bringup; - if (cpu_dying(st->cpu) != !bringup) - set_cpu_dying(st->cpu, !bringup); + if (cpu_dying(cpu) != !bringup) + set_cpu_dying(cpu, !bringup); } /* Regular hotplug invocation of the AP hotplug thread */ @@ -541,15 +541,16 @@ static void __cpuhp_kick_ap(struct cpuhp_cpu_state *st) wait_for_ap_thread(st, st->bringup); } -static int cpuhp_kick_ap(struct cpuhp_cpu_state *st, enum cpuhp_state target) +static int cpuhp_kick_ap(int cpu, struct cpuhp_cpu_state *st, + enum cpuhp_state target) { enum cpuhp_state prev_state; int ret; - prev_state = cpuhp_set_state(st, target); + prev_state = cpuhp_set_state(cpu, st, target); __cpuhp_kick_ap(st); if ((ret = st->result)) { - cpuhp_reset_state(st, prev_state); + cpuhp_reset_state(cpu, st, prev_state); __cpuhp_kick_ap(st); } @@ -581,7 +582,7 @@ static int bringup_wait_for_ap(unsigned int cpu) if (st->target <= CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_IDLE) return 0; - return cpuhp_kick_ap(st, st->target); + return cpuhp_kick_ap(cpu, st, st->target); } static int bringup_cpu(unsigned int cpu) @@ -704,7 +705,7 @@ static int cpuhp_up_callbacks(unsigned int cpu, struct cpuhp_cpu_state *st, ret, cpu, cpuhp_get_step(st->state)->name, st->state); - cpuhp_reset_state(st, prev_state); + cpuhp_reset_state(cpu, st, prev_state); if (can_rollback_cpu(st)) WARN_ON(cpuhp_invoke_callback_range(false, cpu, st, prev_state)); @@ -721,7 +722,6 @@ static void cpuhp_create(unsigned int cpu) init_completion(&st->done_up); init_completion(&st->done_down); - st->cpu = cpu; } static int cpuhp_should_run(unsigned int cpu) @@ -875,7 +875,7 @@ static int cpuhp_kick_ap_work(unsigned int cpu) cpuhp_lock_release(true); trace_cpuhp_enter(cpu, st->target, prev_state, cpuhp_kick_ap_work); - ret = cpuhp_kick_ap(st, st->target); + ret = cpuhp_kick_ap(cpu, st, st->target); trace_cpuhp_exit(cpu, st->state, prev_state, ret); return ret; @@ -1107,7 +1107,7 @@ static int cpuhp_down_callbacks(unsigned int cpu, struct cpuhp_cpu_state *st, ret, cpu, cpuhp_get_step(st->state)->name, st->state); - cpuhp_reset_state(st, prev_state); + cpuhp_reset_state(cpu, st, prev_state); if (st->state < prev_state) WARN_ON(cpuhp_invoke_callback_range(true, cpu, st, @@ -1134,7 +1134,7 @@ static int __ref _cpu_down(unsigned int cpu, int tasks_frozen, cpuhp_tasks_frozen = tasks_frozen; - prev_state = cpuhp_set_state(st, target); + prev_state = cpuhp_set_state(cpu, st, target); /* * If the current CPU state is in the range of the AP hotplug thread, * then we need to kick the thread. @@ -1165,7 +1165,7 @@ static int __ref _cpu_down(unsigned int cpu, int tasks_frozen, ret = cpuhp_down_callbacks(cpu, st, target); if (ret && st->state < prev_state) { if (st->state == CPUHP_TEARDOWN_CPU) { - cpuhp_reset_state(st, prev_state); + cpuhp_reset_state(cpu, st, prev_state); __cpuhp_kick_ap(st); } else { WARN(1, "DEAD callback error for CPU%d", cpu); @@ -1352,7 +1352,7 @@ static int _cpu_up(unsigned int cpu, int tasks_frozen, enum cpuhp_state target) cpuhp_tasks_frozen = tasks_frozen; - cpuhp_set_state(st, target); + cpuhp_set_state(cpu, st, target); /* * If the current CPU state is in the range of the AP hotplug thread, * then we need to kick the thread once more. -- cgit From 9e02977bfad006af328add9434c8bffa40e053bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chao Gao Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 08:32:22 +0200 Subject: dma-direct: avoid redundant memory sync for swiotlb When we looked into FIO performance with swiotlb enabled in VM, we found swiotlb_bounce() is always called one more time than expected for each DMA read request. It turns out that the bounce buffer is copied to original DMA buffer twice after the completion of a DMA request (one is done by in dma_direct_sync_single_for_cpu(), the other by swiotlb_tbl_unmap_single()). But the content in bounce buffer actually doesn't change between the two rounds of copy. So, one round of copy is redundant. Pass DMA_ATTR_SKIP_CPU_SYNC flag to swiotlb_tbl_unmap_single() to skip the memory copy in it. This fix increases FIO 64KB sequential read throughput in a guest with swiotlb=force by 5.6%. Fixes: 55897af63091 ("dma-direct: merge swiotlb_dma_ops into the dma_direct code") Reported-by: Wang Zhaoyang1 Reported-by: Gao Liang Signed-off-by: Chao Gao Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig --- kernel/dma/direct.h | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/dma/direct.h b/kernel/dma/direct.h index 4632b0f4f72e..8a6cd53dbe8c 100644 --- a/kernel/dma/direct.h +++ b/kernel/dma/direct.h @@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ static inline void dma_direct_unmap_page(struct device *dev, dma_addr_t addr, dma_direct_sync_single_for_cpu(dev, addr, size, dir); if (unlikely(is_swiotlb_buffer(dev, phys))) - swiotlb_tbl_unmap_single(dev, phys, size, dir, attrs); + swiotlb_tbl_unmap_single(dev, phys, size, dir, + attrs | DMA_ATTR_SKIP_CPU_SYNC); } #endif /* _KERNEL_DMA_DIRECT_H */ -- cgit From 25934fcfb93c4687ad32fd3d062bcf03457129d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zqiang Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2022 19:13:34 -0700 Subject: irq_work: use kasan_record_aux_stack_noalloc() record callstack On PREEMPT_RT kernel and KASAN is enabled. the kasan_record_aux_stack() may call alloc_pages(), and the rt-spinlock will be acquired, if currently in atomic context, will trigger warning: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:46 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 239, name: bootlogd Preemption disabled at: [] rt_mutex_slowunlock+0xa1/0x4e0 CPU: 3 PID: 239 Comm: bootlogd Tainted: G W 5.17.1-rt17-yocto-preempt-rt+ #105 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b3f840-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: __might_resched.cold+0x13b/0x173 rt_spin_lock+0x5b/0xf0 get_page_from_freelist+0x20c/0x1610 __alloc_pages+0x25e/0x5e0 __stack_depot_save+0x3c0/0x4a0 kasan_save_stack+0x3a/0x50 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xb6/0xc0 kasan_record_aux_stack+0xe/0x10 irq_work_queue_on+0x6a/0x1c0 pull_rt_task+0x631/0x6b0 do_balance_callbacks+0x56/0x80 __balance_callbacks+0x63/0x90 rt_mutex_setprio+0x349/0x880 rt_mutex_slowunlock+0x22a/0x4e0 rt_spin_unlock+0x49/0x80 uart_write+0x186/0x2b0 do_output_char+0x2e9/0x3a0 n_tty_write+0x306/0x800 file_tty_write.isra.0+0x2af/0x450 tty_write+0x22/0x30 new_sync_write+0x27c/0x3a0 vfs_write+0x3f7/0x5d0 ksys_write+0xd9/0x180 __x64_sys_write+0x43/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x44/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Fix it by using kasan_record_aux_stack_noalloc() to avoid the call to alloc_pages(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220402142555.2699582-1-qiang1.zhang@intel.com Signed-off-by: Zqiang Cc: Andrey Ryabinin Cc: Alexander Potapenko Cc: Andrey Konovalov Cc: Dmitry Vyukov Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- kernel/irq_work.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/irq_work.c b/kernel/irq_work.c index f7df715ec28e..7afa40fe5cc4 100644 --- a/kernel/irq_work.c +++ b/kernel/irq_work.c @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ bool irq_work_queue_on(struct irq_work *work, int cpu) if (!irq_work_claim(work)) return false; - kasan_record_aux_stack(work); + kasan_record_aux_stack_noalloc(work); preempt_disable(); if (cpu != smp_processor_id()) { -- cgit From 40f5aa4c5eaebfeaca4566217cb9c468e28ed682 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: kuyo chang Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2022 17:02:20 +0800 Subject: sched/pelt: Fix attach_entity_load_avg() corner case The warning in cfs_rq_is_decayed() triggered: SCHED_WARN_ON(cfs_rq->avg.load_avg || cfs_rq->avg.util_avg || cfs_rq->avg.runnable_avg) There exists a corner case in attach_entity_load_avg() which will cause load_sum to be zero while load_avg will not be. Consider se_weight is 88761 as per the sched_prio_to_weight[] table. Further assume the get_pelt_divider() is 47742, this gives: se->avg.load_avg is 1. However, calculating load_sum: se->avg.load_sum = div_u64(se->avg.load_avg * se->avg.load_sum, se_weight(se)); se->avg.load_sum = 1*47742/88761 = 0. Then enqueue_load_avg() adds this to the cfs_rq totals: cfs_rq->avg.load_avg += se->avg.load_avg; cfs_rq->avg.load_sum += se_weight(se) * se->avg.load_sum; Resulting in load_avg being 1 with load_sum is 0, which will trigger the WARN. Fixes: f207934fb79d ("sched/fair: Align PELT windows between cfs_rq and its se") Signed-off-by: kuyo chang [peterz: massage changelog] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Reviewed-by: Vincent Guittot Tested-by: Dietmar Eggemann Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220414090229.342-1-kuyo.chang@mediatek.com --- kernel/sched/fair.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/sched/fair.c b/kernel/sched/fair.c index d4bd299d67ab..a68482d66535 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/fair.c +++ b/kernel/sched/fair.c @@ -3829,11 +3829,11 @@ static void attach_entity_load_avg(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, struct sched_entity *s se->avg.runnable_sum = se->avg.runnable_avg * divider; - se->avg.load_sum = divider; - if (se_weight(se)) { - se->avg.load_sum = - div_u64(se->avg.load_avg * se->avg.load_sum, se_weight(se)); - } + se->avg.load_sum = se->avg.load_avg * divider; + if (se_weight(se) < se->avg.load_sum) + se->avg.load_sum = div_u64(se->avg.load_sum, se_weight(se)); + else + se->avg.load_sum = 1; enqueue_load_avg(cfs_rq, se); cfs_rq->avg.util_avg += se->avg.util_avg; -- cgit From 60490e7966659b26d74bf1fa4aa8693d9a94ca88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhipeng Xie Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 09:54:17 -0500 Subject: perf/core: Fix perf_mmap fail when CONFIG_PERF_USE_VMALLOC enabled This problem can be reproduced with CONFIG_PERF_USE_VMALLOC enabled on both x86_64 and aarch64 arch when using sysdig -B(using ebpf)[1]. sysdig -B works fine after rebuilding the kernel with CONFIG_PERF_USE_VMALLOC disabled. I tracked it down to the if condition event->rb->nr_pages != nr_pages in perf_mmap is true when CONFIG_PERF_USE_VMALLOC is enabled where event->rb->nr_pages = 1 and nr_pages = 2048 resulting perf_mmap to return -EINVAL. This is because when CONFIG_PERF_USE_VMALLOC is enabled, rb->nr_pages is always equal to 1. Arch with CONFIG_PERF_USE_VMALLOC enabled by default: arc/arm/csky/mips/sh/sparc/xtensa Arch with CONFIG_PERF_USE_VMALLOC disabled by default: x86_64/aarch64/... Fix this problem by using data_page_nr() [1] https://github.com/draios/sysdig Fixes: 906010b2134e ("perf_event: Provide vmalloc() based mmap() backing") Signed-off-by: Zhipeng Xie Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220209145417.6495-1-xiezhipeng1@huawei.com --- kernel/events/core.c | 2 +- kernel/events/internal.h | 5 +++++ kernel/events/ring_buffer.c | 5 ----- 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index 23bb19716ad3..7858bafffa9d 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -6247,7 +6247,7 @@ static int perf_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) again: mutex_lock(&event->mmap_mutex); if (event->rb) { - if (event->rb->nr_pages != nr_pages) { + if (data_page_nr(event->rb) != nr_pages) { ret = -EINVAL; goto unlock; } diff --git a/kernel/events/internal.h b/kernel/events/internal.h index 082832738c8f..5150d5f84c03 100644 --- a/kernel/events/internal.h +++ b/kernel/events/internal.h @@ -116,6 +116,11 @@ static inline int page_order(struct perf_buffer *rb) } #endif +static inline int data_page_nr(struct perf_buffer *rb) +{ + return rb->nr_pages << page_order(rb); +} + static inline unsigned long perf_data_size(struct perf_buffer *rb) { return rb->nr_pages << (PAGE_SHIFT + page_order(rb)); diff --git a/kernel/events/ring_buffer.c b/kernel/events/ring_buffer.c index 52868716ec35..fb35b926024c 100644 --- a/kernel/events/ring_buffer.c +++ b/kernel/events/ring_buffer.c @@ -859,11 +859,6 @@ void rb_free(struct perf_buffer *rb) } #else -static int data_page_nr(struct perf_buffer *rb) -{ - return rb->nr_pages << page_order(rb); -} - static struct page * __perf_mmap_to_page(struct perf_buffer *rb, unsigned long pgoff) { -- cgit From ecc04463d1a36f88baa750d45dfb02c364e1fdb1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Aleksandr Nogikh Date: Thu, 21 Apr 2022 16:36:07 -0700 Subject: kcov: don't generate a warning on vm_insert_page()'s failure vm_insert_page()'s failure is not an unexpected condition, so don't do WARN_ONCE() in such a case. Instead, print a kernel message and just return an error code. This flaw has been reported under an OOM condition by sysbot [1]. The message is mainly for the benefit of the test log, in this case the fuzzer's log so that humans inspecting the log can figure out what was going on. KCOV is a testing tool, so I think being a little more chatty when KCOV unexpectedly is about to fail will save someone debugging time. We don't want the WARN, because it's not a kernel bug that syzbot should report, and failure can happen if the fuzzer tries hard enough (as above). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/Ylkr2xrVbhQYwNLf@elver.google.com [1] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220401182512.249282-1-nogikh@google.com Fixes: b3d7fe86fbd0 ("kcov: properly handle subsequent mmap calls"), Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Nogikh Acked-by: Marco Elver Cc: Dmitry Vyukov Cc: Andrey Konovalov Cc: Alexander Potapenko Cc: Taras Madan Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- kernel/kcov.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/kcov.c b/kernel/kcov.c index 475524bd900a..b3732b210593 100644 --- a/kernel/kcov.c +++ b/kernel/kcov.c @@ -475,8 +475,11 @@ static int kcov_mmap(struct file *filep, struct vm_area_struct *vma) vma->vm_flags |= VM_DONTEXPAND; for (off = 0; off < size; off += PAGE_SIZE) { page = vmalloc_to_page(kcov->area + off); - if (vm_insert_page(vma, vma->vm_start + off, page)) - WARN_ONCE(1, "vm_insert_page() failed"); + res = vm_insert_page(vma, vma->vm_start + off, page); + if (res) { + pr_warn_once("kcov: vm_insert_page() failed\n"); + return res; + } } return 0; exit: -- cgit From 1d661ed54d8613c97bcff2c7d6181c61e482a1da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Adam Zabrocki Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2022 18:40:27 +0200 Subject: kprobes: Fix KRETPROBES when CONFIG_KRETPROBE_ON_RETHOOK is set The recent kernel change in 73f9b911faa7 ("kprobes: Use rethook for kretprobe if possible"), introduced a potential NULL pointer dereference bug in the KRETPROBE mechanism. The official Kprobes documentation defines that "Any or all handlers can be NULL". Unfortunately, there is a missing return handler verification to fulfill these requirements and can result in a NULL pointer dereference bug. This patch adds such verification in kretprobe_rethook_handler() function. Fixes: 73f9b911faa7 ("kprobes: Use rethook for kretprobe if possible") Signed-off-by: Adam Zabrocki Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu Cc: Steven Rostedt Cc: Naveen N. Rao Cc: Anil S. Keshavamurthy Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220422164027.GA7862@pi3.com.pl --- kernel/kprobes.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/kprobes.c b/kernel/kprobes.c index dbe57df2e199..dd58c0be9ce2 100644 --- a/kernel/kprobes.c +++ b/kernel/kprobes.c @@ -2126,7 +2126,7 @@ static void kretprobe_rethook_handler(struct rethook_node *rh, void *data, struct kprobe_ctlblk *kcb; /* The data must NOT be null. This means rethook data structure is broken. */ - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!data)) + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!data) || !rp->handler) return; __this_cpu_write(current_kprobe, &rp->kp); -- cgit