aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
Commit message (Collapse)AuthorAgeFilesLines
* [ena] Allocate an unused Asynchronous Event Notification Queue (AENQ)aenqAlexander Graf2023-01-182-0/+139
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | We currently don't allocate an Asynchronous Event Notification Queue (AENQ) because we don't actually care about any of the events that may come in. The ENA firmware found on Graviton instances requires the AENQ to exist, otherwise all admin queue commands will fail. Fix by allocating an AENQ and disabling all events (so that we do not need to include code to acknowledge any events that may arrive). Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
* [netdevice] Ensure consistent interpretation of "netX" device nameMichael Brown2023-01-171-2/+2
| | | | | | | | Ensure that the "${netX/...}" settings mechanism always uses the same interpretation of the network device corresponding to "netX" as any other mechanism that performs a name-based lookup of a network device. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [efi] Create VLAN autoboot device automaticallyautovlanMichael Brown2023-01-151-0/+9
| | | | | | | When chainloading iPXE from an EFI VLAN device, configure the corresponding iPXE VLAN device to be created automatically. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [vlan] Support automatic VLAN device creationMichael Brown2023-01-152-0/+49
| | | | | | | Add the ability to automatically create a VLAN device for a specified trunk device link-layer address and VLAN tag. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [autoboot] Include VLAN tag in filter for identifying autoboot deviceMichael Brown2023-01-155-8/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | When chainloading iPXE from a VLAN device, the MAC address of the loaded image's device handle will match the MAC address of the trunk device created by iPXE, and the autoboot process will then erroneously consider the trunk device to be an autoboot device. Fix by recording the VLAN tag along with the MAC address, and treating the VLAN tag as part of the filter used to match the MAC address against candidate network devices. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [netdevice] Allow duplicate MAC addressesMichael Brown2023-01-155-38/+56
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Many laptops now include the ability to specify a "system-specific MAC address" (also known as "pass-through MAC"), which is supposed to be used for both the onboard NIC and for any attached docking station or other USB NIC. This is intended to simplify interoperability with software or hardware that relies on a MAC address to recognise an individual machine: for example, a deployment server may associate the MAC address with a particular operating system image to be deployed. This therefore creates legitimate situations in which duplicate MAC addresses may exist within the same system. As described in commit 98d09a1 ("[netdevice] Avoid registering duplicate network devices"), the Xen netfront driver relies on the rejection of duplicate MAC addresses in order to inhibit registration of the emulated PCI devices that a Xen PV-HVM guest will create to shadow each of the paravirtual network devices. Move the code that rejects duplicate MAC addresses from the network device core to the Xen netfront driver, to allow for the existence of duplicate MAC addresses in non-Xen setups. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [netdevice] Separate concept of scope ID from network device name indexMichael Brown2023-01-1410-33/+36
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The network device index currently serves two purposes: acting as a sequential index for network device names ("net0", "net1", etc), and acting as an opaque unique integer identifier used in socket address scope IDs. There is no particular need for these usages to be linked, and it can lead to situations in which devices are named unexpectedly. For example: if a system has two network devices "net0" and "net1", a VLAN is created as "net1-42", and then a USB NIC is connected, then the USB NIC will be named "net3" rather than the expected "net2" since the VLAN device "net1-42" will have consumed an index. Separate the usages: rename the "index" field to "scope_id" (matching its one and only use case), and assign the name without reference to the scope ID by finding the first unused name. For consistency, assign the scope ID by similarly finding the first unused scope ID. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [efi] Disable receive filters to work around buggy UNDI driversMichael Brown2023-01-111-10/+47
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Some UNDI drivers (such as the AMI UsbNetworkPkg currently in the process of being upstreamed into EDK2) have a bug that will prevent any packets from being received unless at least one attempt has been made to disable some receive filters. Work around these buggy drivers by attempting to disable receive filters before enabling them. Ignore any errors, since we genuinely do not care whether or not the disabling succeeds. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [cachedhcp] Retain cached DHCPACK after startup if not already consumedefivlanMichael Brown2022-12-221-4/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | We currently free an unclaimed cached DHCPACK immediately after startup, in order to free up memory. This prevents the cached DHCPACK from being applied to a device that is created after startup, such as a VLAN device created via the "vcreate" command. Retain any unclaimed DHCPACK after startup to allow it to be matched against (and applied to) any device that gets created at runtime. Free the DHCPACK during shutdown if it still remains unclaimed, in order to exit with memory cleanly freed. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [cachedhcp] Include VLAN tag in filter for applying cached DHCPACKMichael Brown2022-12-226-15/+41
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When chainloading iPXE from a VLAN device, the MAC address within the cached DHCPACK will match the MAC address of the trunk device created by iPXE, and the cached DHCPACK will then end up being erroneously applied to the trunk device. This tends to break outbound IPv4 routing, since both the trunk and VLAN devices will have the same assigned IPv4 address. Fix by recording the VLAN tag along with the cached DHCPACK, and treating the VLAN tag as part of the filter used to match the cached DHCPACK against candidate network devices. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [efi] Add efi_path_vlan() utility functionMichael Brown2022-12-222-0/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | EFI provides no API for determining the VLAN tag (if any) for a specified device handle. There is the EFI_VLAN_CONFIG_PROTOCOL, but that exists only on the trunk device handle (not on the VLAN device handle), and provides no way to match VLAN tags against the trunk device's child device handles. The EDK2 codebase seems to rely solely on the device path to determine the VLAN tag for a specified device handle: both NetLibGetVlanId() and BmGetNetworkDescription() will parse the device path to search for a VLAN_DEVICE_PATH component. Add efi_path_vlan() which uses the same device path parsing logic to determine the VLAN tag. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [efi] Expose efi_path_next() utility functionMichael Brown2022-12-223-15/+41
| | | | | | | Provide a single central implementation of the logic for stepping through elements of an EFI device path. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [efi] Allow passing a NULL device path to path utility functionsMichael Brown2022-12-222-5/+5
| | | | Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [efi] Provide VLAN configuration protocolMichael Brown2022-12-146-4/+227
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | UEFI implements VLAN support within the Managed Network Protocol (MNP) driver, which may create child VLAN devices automatically based on stored UEFI variables. These child devices do not themselves provide a raw-packet interface via EFI_SIMPLE_NETWORK_PROTOCOL, and may be consumed only via the EFI_MANAGED_NETWORK_PROTOCOL interface. The device paths constructed for these child devices may conflict with those for the EFI_SIMPLE_NETWORK_PROTOCOL instances that iPXE attempts to install for its own VLAN devices. The upshot is that creating an iPXE VLAN device (e.g. via the "vcreate" command) will fail if the UEFI Managed Network Protocol has already created a device for the same VLAN tag. Fix by providing our own EFI_VLAN_CONFIG_PROTOCOL instance on the same device handle as EFI_SIMPLE_NETWORK_PROTOCOL. This causes the MNP driver to treat iPXE's device as supporting hardware VLAN offload, and it will therefore not attempt to install its own instance of the protocol. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [vlan] Allow external code to identify VLAN priority as well as tagMichael Brown2022-12-143-7/+19
| | | | Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [build] Disable dangling pointer checking for GCCgcc12Michael Brown2022-12-141-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | The dangling pointer warning introduced in GCC 12 reports false positives that result in build failures. In particular, storing the address of a local code label used to record the current state of a state machine (as done in crypto/deflate.c) is reported as an error. There seems to be no way to mark the pointer type as being permitted to hold such a value, so unconditionally disable the warning. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [build] Disable array bounds checking for GCCMichael Brown2022-12-141-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | The array bounds checker on GCC 12 and newer reports a very large number of false positives that result in build failures. In particular, accesses through pointers to zero-length arrays (such as those used by the linker table mechanism in include/ipxe/tables.h) are reported as errors, contrary to the GCC documentation. Work around this GCC issue by unconditionally disabling the warning. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [intel] Add PCI ID for I219-V and -LM 16,17Christian I. Nilsson2022-11-151-0/+4
| | | | | Signed-off-by: Christian I. Nilsson <nikize@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [pci] Backup and restore standard config space across PCIe FLRMichael Brown2022-11-131-2/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | The behaviour of PCI devices across a function-level reset seems to be inconsistent in practice: some devices will preserve PCI BARs, some will not. Fix the behaviour of FLR on devices that do not preserve PCI BARs by backing up and restoring PCI configuration space across the reset. Preserve only the standard portion of the configuration space, since there may be registers with unexpected side effects in the remaining non-standardised space. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [pci] Allow PCI config space backup to be limited by maximum offsetMichael Brown2022-11-135-13/+22
| | | | Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [tls] Add GCM cipher suitesMichael Brown2022-11-107-8/+147
| | | | Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [tests] Verify ability to perform in-place encryption and decryptionMichael Brown2022-11-101-4/+6
| | | | | | | | | | TLS relies upon the ability of ciphers to perform in-place decryption, in order to avoid allocating additional I/O buffers for received data. Add verification of in-place encryption and decryption to the cipher self-tests. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [crypto] Support in-place decryption for GCM ciphersMichael Brown2022-11-101-34/+32
| | | | | | | | | | | | The hash calculation is currently performed incorrectly when decrypting in place, since the ciphertext will have been overwritten with the plaintext before being used to update the hash value. Restructure the code to allow for in-place encryption and decryption. Choose to optimise for the decryption case, since we are likely to decrypt much more data than we encrypt. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [tests] Verify ability to reset cipher initialisation vectorMichael Brown2022-11-091-0/+38
| | | | | | | | | | TLS relies upon the ability to reuse a cipher by resetting only the initialisation vector while reusing the existing key. Add verification of resetting the initialisation vector to the cipher self-tests. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [crypto] Ensure relevant GCM cipher state is cleared by cipher_setiv()Michael Brown2022-11-092-11/+17
| | | | | | | Reset the accumulated authentication state when cipher_setiv() is called, to allow the cipher to be reused without resetting the key. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [tls] Allow handshake digest algorithm to be specified by cipher suiteMichael Brown2022-11-094-68/+125
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | All existing cipher suites use SHA-256 as the TLSv1.2 and above handshake digest algorithm (even when using SHA-1 as the MAC digest algorithm). Some GCM cipher suites use SHA-384 as the handshake digest algorithm. Allow the cipher suite to specify the handshake (and PRF) digest algorithm to be used for TLSv1.2 and above. This requires some restructuring to allow for the fact that the ClientHello message must be included within the handshake digest, even though the relevant digest algorithm is not yet known at the point that the ClientHello is sent. Fortunately, the ClientHello may be reproduced verbatim at the point of receiving the ServerHello, so we rely on reconstructing (rather than storing) this message. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [tls] Always send maximum supported version in ClientHelloMichael Brown2022-11-091-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | Always send the maximum supported version in our ClientHello message, even when performing renegotiation (in which case the current version may already be lower than the maximum supported version). This is permitted by the specification, and allows the ClientHello to be reconstructed verbatim at the point of selecting the handshake digest algorithm in tls_new_server_hello(). Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [tls] Add support for AEAD ciphersMichael Brown2022-11-081-2/+39
| | | | | | | | Allow for AEAD cipher suites where the MAC length may be zero and the authentication is instead provided by an authenticating cipher, with the plaintext authentication tag appended to the ciphertext. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [tls] Treat invalid block padding as zero length paddingMichael Brown2022-11-081-2/+2
| | | | | | | | Harden against padding oracle attacks by treating invalid block padding as zero length padding, thereby deferring the failure until after computing the (incorrect) MAC. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [tls] Allow for arbitrary-length initialisation vectorsMichael Brown2022-11-082-186/+148
| | | | | | | | | Restructure the encryption and decryption operations to allow for the use of ciphers where the initialisation vector is constructed by concatenating the fixed IV (derived as part of key expansion) with a record IV (prepended to the ciphertext). Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [tls] Add MAC length as a cipher suite parameterMichael Brown2022-11-084-16/+28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | TLS stream and block ciphers use a MAC with a length equal to the output length of the digest algorithm in use. For AEAD ciphers there is no MAC, with the equivalent functionality provided by the cipher algorithm's authentication tag. Allow for the existence of AEAD cipher suites by making the MAC length a parameter of the cipher suite. Assume that the MAC key length is equal to the MAC length, since this is true for all currently supported cipher suites. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [tls] Abstract out concept of a TLS authentication headerMichael Brown2022-11-082-21/+27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | All TLS cipher types use a common structure for the per-record data that is authenticated in addition to the plaintext itself. This data is used as a prefix in the HMAC calculation for stream and block ciphers, or as additional authenticated data for AEAD ciphers. Define a "TLS authentication header" structure to hold this data as a contiguous block, in order to meet the alignment requirement for AEAD ciphers such as GCM. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [tls] Ensure cipher alignment size is respectedMichael Brown2022-11-071-0/+18
| | | | | | | | Adjust the length of the first received ciphertext data buffer to ensure that all decryption operations respect the cipher's alignment size. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [crypto] Add concept of cipher alignment sizeMichael Brown2022-11-078-1/+33
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The GCM cipher mode of operation (in common with other counter-based modes of operation) has a notion of blocksize that does not neatly fall into our current abstraction: it does operate in 16-byte blocks but allows for an arbitrary overall data length (i.e. the final block may be incomplete). Model this by adding a concept of alignment size. Each call to encrypt() or decrypt() must begin at a multiple of the alignment size from the start of the data stream. This allows us to model GCM by using a block size of 1 byte and an alignment size of 16 bytes. As a side benefit, this same concept allows us to neatly model the fact that raw AES can encrypt only a single 16-byte block, by specifying an alignment size of zero on this cipher. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [tls] Formalise notions of fixed and record initialisation vectorsMichael Brown2022-11-074-5/+48
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | TLS block ciphers always use CBC (as per RFC 5246 section 6.2.3.2) with a record initialisation vector length that is equal to the cipher block size, and no fixed initialisation vector. The initialisation vector for AEAD ciphers such as GCM is less straightforward, and requires both a fixed and per-record component. Extend the definition of a cipher suite to include fixed and record initialisation vector lengths, and generate the fixed portion (if any) as part of key expansion. Do not add explicit calls to cipher_setiv() in tls_assemble_block() and tls_split_block(), since the constraints imposed by RFC 5246 are specifically chosen to allow implementations to avoid doing so. (Instead, add a sanity check that the record initialisation vector length is equal to the cipher block size.) Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [tls] Remove support for TLSv1.0Michael Brown2022-11-072-36/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The TLSv1.0 protocol was deprecated by RFC 8996 (along with TLSv1.1), and has been disabled by default in iPXE since commit dc785b0fb ("[tls] Default to supporting only TLSv1.1 or above") in June 2020. While there is value in continuing to support older protocols for interoperability with older server appliances, the additional complexity of supporting the implicit initialisation vector for TLSv1.0 is not worth the cost. Remove support for the obsolete TLSv1.0 protocol, to reduce complexity of the implementation and simplify ongoing maintenance. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [efi] Clear DMA-coherent buffers before mappingioactiveMichael Brown2022-11-041-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The DMA mapping is performed implicitly as part of the call to dma_alloc(). The current implementation creates the IOMMU mapping for the allocated and potentially uninitialised data before returning to the caller (which will immediately zero out or otherwise initialise the buffer). This leaves a small window within which a malicious PCI device could potentially attempt to retrieve firmware-owned secrets present in the uninitialised buffer. (Note that the hypothetically malicious PCI device has no viable way to know the address of the buffer from which to attempt a DMA read, rendering the attack extremely implausible.) Guard against any such hypothetical attacks by zeroing out the allocated buffer prior to creating the coherent DMA mapping. Suggested-by: Mateusz Siwiec <Mateusz.Siwiec@ioactive.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [bzimage] Fix parsing of "vga=..." when not at end of command linevgafixMichael Brown2022-10-271-4/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | bzimage_parse_cmdline() uses strcmp() to identify the named "vga=..." kernel command line option values, which will give a false negative if the option is not last on the command line. Fix by temporarily changing the relevant command line separator (if any) to a NUL terminator. Debugged-by: Simon Rettberg <simon.rettberg@rz.uni-freiburg.de> Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [crypto] Add block cipher Galois/Counter mode of operationMichael Brown2022-10-257-0/+1072
| | | | Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [crypto] Add concept of authentication tag to cipher algorithmsMichael Brown2022-10-259-7/+64
| | | | | | | | Some ciphers (such as GCM) support the concept of a tag that can be used to authenticate the encrypted data. Add a cipher method for generating an authentication tag. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [crypto] Add concept of additional data to cipher algorithmsMichael Brown2022-10-254-23/+47
| | | | | | | | | | | Some ciphers (such as GCM) support the concept of additional authenticated data, which does not appear in the ciphertext but may affect the operation of the cipher. Allow cipher_encrypt() and cipher_decrypt() to be called with a NULL destination buffer in order to pass additional data. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [crypto] Allow initialisation vector length to vary from cipher blocksizeMichael Brown2022-10-257-16/+24
| | | | Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [crypto] Expose null crypto algorithm methods for reuseMichael Brown2022-10-254-51/+54
| | | | Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [tls] Add support for DHE variants of the existing cipher suitesMichael Brown2022-10-113-4/+56
| | | | Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [tls] Add support for Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchangeMichael Brown2022-10-112-0/+247
| | | | Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [tls] Add key exchange mechanism to definition of cipher suiteMichael Brown2022-10-114-3/+48
| | | | | | | Allow for the key exchange mechanism to vary depending upon the selected cipher suite. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [tls] Record ServerKeyExchange record, if providedMichael Brown2022-10-112-0/+40
| | | | | | | Accept and record the ServerKeyExchange record, which is required for key exchange mechanisms such as Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (DHE). Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [tls] Generate pre-master secret at point of sending ClientKeyExchangeMichael Brown2022-10-112-26/+27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | The pre-master secret is currently constructed at the time of instantiating the TLS connection. This precludes the use of key exchange mechanisms such as Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (DHE), which require a ServerKeyExchange message to exchange additional key material before the pre-master secret can be constructed. Allow for the use of such cipher suites by deferring generation of the master secret until the point of sending the ClientKeyExchange message. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [tls] Generate master secret at point of sending ClientKeyExchangeMichael Brown2022-10-111-8/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | The master secret is currently constructed upon receiving the ServerHello message. This precludes the use of key exchange mechanisms such as Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (DHE), which require a ServerKeyExchange message to exchange additional key material before the pre-master secret and master secret can be constructed. Allow for the use of such cipher suites by deferring generation of the master secret until the point of sending the ClientKeyExchange message. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [crypto] Add Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithmMichael Brown2022-10-115-0/+936
| | | | | | | | Add an implementation of the Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm as defined in RFC2631, with test vectors taken from the NIST Cryptographic Toolkit. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
generated by cgit (git 2.34.1) at 2025-02-23 01:53:28 +0000