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* [eap] Allow MD5-Challenge authentication method to be disabledMichael Brown2024-02-231-82/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | RFC 3748 states that implementations must support the MD5-Challenge method. However, some network environments may wish to disable it as a matter of policy. Allow support for MD5-Challenge to be controllable via the build configuration option EAP_METHOD_MD5 in config/general.h. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [eap] Add progress debug messagesMichael Brown2024-02-231-1/+11
| | | | | | | Add debug messages for each EAP Request and Response, and to show the list of methods offered when sending a Nak. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [eap] Add support for the MD5-Challenge authentication typeMichael Brown2024-01-101-0/+80
| | | | | | | | | RFC 3748 states that support for MD5-Challenge is mandatory for EAP implementations. The MD5 and CHAP code is already included in the default build since it is required by iSCSI, and so this does not substantially increase the binary size. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [eap] Add support for sending an EAP identityMichael Brown2024-01-101-20/+137
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Allow the ${netX/username} setting to be used to specify an EAP identity to be returned in response to a Request-Identity, and provide a mechanism for responding with a NAK to indicate which authentication types we support. If no identity is specified then fall back to the current behaviour of not sending any Request-Identity response, so that switches will time out and switch to MAC Authentication Bypass (MAB) if applicable. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [eap] Ignore any received EAP responsesMichael Brown2024-01-101-0/+3
| | | | | | | EAP responses (including our own) may be broadcast by switches but are not of interest to us and can be safely ignored if received. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [eapol] Delay EAPoL-Start while waiting for EAP to completeMichael Brown2023-11-071-5/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | EAP exchanges may take a long time to reach a final status, especially when relying upon MAC Authentication Bypass (MAB). Our current behaviour of sending EAPoL-Start every few seconds until a final status is obtained can prevent these exchanges from ever completing. Fix by redefining the EAP supplicant state to allow EAPoL-Start to be suppressed: either temporarily (while waiting for a full EAP exchange to complete, in which case we need to eventually resend EAPoL-Start if the final Success or Failure packet is lost), or permanently (while waiting for the potentially very long MAC Authentication Bypass timeout period). Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [eap] Define a supplicant model for EAP and EAPoLMichael Brown2023-09-181-14/+29
| | | | | | | | Extend the EAP model to include a record of whether or not EAP authentication has completed (successfully or otherwise), and to provide a method for transmitting EAP responses. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [eap] Treat an EAP Request-Identity as indicating a blocked linkMichael Brown2021-01-191-0/+142
A switch port using 802.1x authentication will send EAP Request-Identity packets once the physical link is up, and will not be forwarding packets until the port identity has been established. We do not currently support 802.1x authentication. However, a reasonably common configuration involves using a preset list of permitted MAC addresses, with the "authentication" taking place between the switch and a RADIUS server. In this configuration, the end device does not need to perform any authentication step, but does need to be prepared for the switch port to fail to forward packets for a substantial time after physical link-up. This exactly matches the "blocked link" semantics already used when detecting a non-forwarding switch port via LACP or STP. Treat a received EAP Request-Identity as indicating a blocked link. Unlike LACP or STP, there is no way to determine the expected time until the next EAP packet and so we must choose a fixed timeout. Erroneously assuming that the link is blocked is relatively harmless since we will still attempt to transmit and receive data even over a link that is marked as blocked, and so the net effect is merely to prolong DHCP attempts. In contrast, erroneously assuming that the link is unblocked will potentially cause DHCP to time out and give up, resulting in a failed boot. The default EAP Request-Identity interval in Cisco switches (where this is most likely to be encountered in practice) is 30 seconds, so choose 45 seconds as a timeout that is likely to avoid gaps during which we falsely assume that the link is unblocked. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>